The Poetic Task of “Becoming Homely”: Heidegger reading Hölderlin reading Sophocles

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ABSTRACT

In view of intensified danger from multiple causes manifesting what Heidegger understood as the rule of planetary technology and the possibility of pitting meditative thinking (besinnliches Denken) against the dominant calculative thinking (rechnendes Denken), there is enhanced need to think further Heidegger’s turn to the poetic word of Hölderlin. Here Heidegger’s attentiveness to Hölderlin’s “The Ister” is engaged with a view to clarifying the significance of “becoming homely” and “dwelling” as part of the task of thinking required of Western humanity if it is to appropriate a “second beginning” such as Heidegger intimates possible. Absent this thinking, the “first beginning” initiated in Greek antiquity promises a thoroughly techno-cratic world order.

Keywords:
Heidegger;
Hölderlin;
“The Ister”;
Technology;
Meditative Thinking
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…lange haben das Schikliche wir gesucht.
[...long have we sought what is fitting.]

Hier aber wollen wir bauen.
[Here, however, we wish to build.]

Im dichterisch Gesagten liegt daher ein eigener Beginn.
[A properly unique beginning thus lies in whatever is said poetically.]

--Hölderlin, “Der Ister”

Im Eigenen zu wohnen ist dann aber jenes, was zuletzt kommt und selten glückt und stets am schrwersten bleibt.
[To dwell in what is one's own is what comes last and is seldom successful and always remains what is most difficult.]

--Heidegger, Hölderlin’s “The Ister” (1996)

Introduction

A s in the latter half of the twentieth century, it remains critically important today to be concerned about the future of humanity in view of ongoing technologically-induced ordering of the planet, technologically driven global interdependence of human settlements, and the challenges of political governance that augur an emerging techno-cratic world order. Nearly half a century ago, in 1971, world order scholar Richard A. Falk published an urgent assessment of our time in his This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival. In that work, Falk highlighted the “underlying causes of planetary danger” and advanced the just cause of an “ecological imperative” that might guide our thinking in view of the long-term human interest, in contrast to the parochial geopolitical interests of nation-states that yet champion the not so benign logic of statecraft. Falk re-emphasized this view in 2009 in juxtaposing the concepts of “ecological urgency” and “environmental justice.” Referring to James Gustave Speth and Peter Haas's Global Environmental Governance, Falk concurred that, “(1) the conditions relating to the global environment are worsening; (2) current responses to address these conditions are grossly insufficient; and (3) major new initiatives are needed that address the root causes.”

The fundamental question at issue here, however, is not merely what counts as efficacious responses to planetary danger. Rather, at issue is the manner of thinking that motivates and moves such responses. The twentieth century has been characterized, to use Falk’s words, as “a time for retrenchment of powerful vested corporate and governmental interests, for Promethean reaffirmations of the capacity of technological innovations to overcome whatever harm could be attributed to the role of technology as the engine of human progress.” Yet, precisely these Promethean reaffirmations of the role of technology and the promise of “technological fixes” are in question; for, as the twentieth century German philosopher Martin Heidegger warned, “What threatens man in his very nature is the view that technological production puts the world in order...” On the contrary, as he said elsewhere in interview in 1966—after his experience of the failure of the Weimar Republic; after the destructive rise of Nazism with its biologistic and

1. Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”; for German text see Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymne “Der Ister”.
2. Falk, “The Second Cycle”
3. Falk, “The Second Cycle”
racist ideology and the consequent loss of the German "homeland;" after the Second World War with the frenzied crime of genocide unconcealed in the technologically-driven Nazi "manufacture of corpses" in the gas chambers of death camps such as Auschwitz and Birkenau; after the unprecedented American indiscriminate use of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, followed by a bipolar nuclear arms race promising "mutually assured destruction" (M.A.D.) of the built world and devastation that would make the planet a wasteland: "[In] the last 30 years, it's certainly become clearer that the planetary movement of modern technology is a force whose magnitude can hardly be overestimated. For me the decisive question today is how this technological age can be subjected to a political system and to which system."

In short, the intensifying planetary rule of technology is, for Heidegger, a manifest cause for thinking differently and, thereby, "renovating" the political beyond the "great politics" (grosse Politik) of the twentieth century national powers that seek dominion over the whole of the planet Earth. At the center of this for Heidegger in 1953-1954 is his concern for what he calls "the complete Europeanization of the earth and of man."

In his *On the Essence of Human Freedom*, Heidegger remarks: "The problem of man poses difficulties which are still hardly beginning to dawn on us." The way we "think"—or fail to think—is indeed what is most problematic in our day, for, as Heidegger commented, "Thoughtlessness is an uncanny visitor who comes and goes everywhere in today's world. [...] [Man] today is in *flight from thinking.*" Indeed, says Heidegger with more profundity: "Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking."

The keyword here is 'das Bedenklichste', which is also to be understood as that which is most questionable, thus what is most to be put into question. But, of course, the question is whether we who live today are provoked to think in a way other than one that further entrenches Promethean reaffirmations of technology as if this were the only mode of thinking and action.

Heidegger reminds us: "Thinking does not become action only because some effect issues from it or because it is applied. Thinking acts insofar as it thinks." To use Heidegger's lexicon in his clarification of the meaning of 'thinking' (Denken), the manner of thinking that yet dominates our time is one of "calculative thinking" (rechnendes Denken), a "calculative rationality" that has its roots in the Western metaphysical foundations of logic, the latter compelling the "logistics" at the core of all technological possibilities of planetary ordering. Heidegger understands our time as one of distortion, as global human settlement is driven by a frenzied calculative rationality. This is not a merely human doing, however. Rather, for Heidegger, it is the disclosure of what was "ventured forth" long ago at the commencement of the Western philosophical tradition in Greek metaphysics, thus in the basic concepts and categories that have determined our view of "reality".

5. Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking*, 48, reflected with patent concern that many Germans "lost their homeland, have had to leave their villages and towns, have been driven from their native soil. Countless others whose homeland was saved, have yet wandered off and have resettled in the wastelands of industrial districts. They are strangers now to their former homeland. And those who remained in the homeland? In many ways they are still more homeless than those who have been driven from their homeland."

6. Heidegger, "Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten." Heidegger, of course, entangled himself in the Nazi movement, the fact of which has generated an immense amount of scholarly debate. For my own contributions to this debate, see Swazo, "L’Sair Heidegger," Swazo, "Gnothi sauton: Heidegger’s Problem Ours," and Swazo, Heidegger’s Entscheidung.

7. Bernard P. Dauenhauser used the term ‘renovating’, in his “Renovating the Problem of Politics.” Dauenhauser responds in part to some remarks of Robert Sokolowski, who argued that, “Heidegger’s conception of the public is not adequate for political life; in terms of the kinds of human association distinguished by Aristotle in Politics 1.2—family, village, city—Heidegger’s thoughts are most appropriate for the village, not the city. A village is not based on any kind of constitution or social contract.” Dauenhauser considered these remarks ‘well-founded’ but nonetheless argued that Heidegger (along with Merleau-Ponty) “show a way to retrieve and renovate what is sound in the political thought which developed under the sway of metaphysics.” In relation to Heidegger’s attraction to the village in contrast to the modern metropolis, see Charles Bambach, “Heidegger, Technology, and the Homeland;” Bambach, taking note here of Heidegger’s remarks delivered in October 1955, comments: “What preoccupied Heidegger as he began to situate his discussion of modernity within the rhetorical topos of the homeland were the sweeping effects of the technological revolution on the fate of modern Germany.”

I concur with the above comments, while nonetheless taking note of a more recent explanatory approach to Heidegger’s entanglement with National Socialism, as presented by Martin Feldman, “Between Geist and Zeitgeist,” who ‘explores the heuristic value of viewing Heidegger as a leading representative of modern intellectuals bent on reconciling eternal aspects of the human mind (Geist) with a ‘spirit of the age’ (Zeitgeist) here characterised by an acute sense of the breakdown of Western civilisation.” Feldman thus allows for an explanatory approach that “[clarifies Heidegger’s] short period of activism and subsequent shift away from the Third Reich toward apoliticism following his disillusionment with the ‘spiritless’ course of its revolution.”


13. Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking*, 46, clarifies: “Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is.”

(i.e., being) and the “knowledge” we seek thereby. What matters for Heidegger and for us is a turn away from this calculative thinking. It is precisely this manner of thinking that is to be questioned and challenged if we are truly to advance beyond the present planetary danger. Heidegger’s post-metaphysical thinking takes on this challenge, hence his import as a thinker in our “destinate” time.

Heidegger turns to the poetry of the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin for insight and guidance. As Andreas Grossmann opines, “With Heidegger’s first Hölderlin lecture in 1934-35, poetry became the thinker’s key partner in the search for an ‘other beginning’ of thought”—i.e., a beginning other than that of metaphysics and all that has ensued from its commencement in Greek philosophy. Grossmann adds, “In the metaphysical plight in which the West now finds itself, the poetic factor is for Heidegger the power from which a people’s historical being originates and on the basis of which philosophical thought and politics are determined […].” Thus, for Heidegger, “Our thinking should take the poetic word as its measure,” in which case it is in Hölderlin’s poetizing (Dichtung) that we are to find our measure (‘our’ here meaning what is proper to Western humanity); for, presumably Hölderlin’s poetry is a “herald of the overcoming of all metaphysics” hitherto. Overcoming (Überwindung) metaphysics implies an overcoming of the derivative Western tradition of political philosophy as well, thus an overcoming of the orientation of modernity’s philosophical orientation in the politics of “the State.” Hölderlin himself understood the import of this in writing, “What has always made the state a hell on earth has been precisely that man has tried to make it heaven.”

Heidegger tells us that Hölderlin’s poetry provides “a hold for thoughtful reflection [Nachdenken]. Thoughtful reflection is meant to awaken our attentiveness.” Thoughtful reflection does not mean an occasion for gaining knowledge (in the strict epistemological sense of that word). Rather, it is through such reflection that we may accomplish what is more imperative, viz., “a fundamental attunement [Grundstimmung] from out of which we always have a sense only for the essential [das Wesentliche] and have the sole vocation of marking out the essential from everything else so as to retain it in the future, to ‘attend’ to it.” A fundamental attunement is possible only through hearing what is essential. This hearing itself is performative and precursor to what may follow, viz., “a moment of vision” (Augenblick) that is essential to seeing our way forward.

In what follows, we shall follow Heidegger’s thoughtful remembrance (Andenken) of Hölderlin’s poem, “The Ister” (as given in lecture from summer 1942). It is important to bear in mind that Heidegger warns against reading Hölderlin metaphysically, in which case a thoughtful reflection has to proceed otherwise. In the case of “The Ister” poem, therefore, one must be cautious of finding in Hölderlin’s imagery of “the river” an allegory in the sense used in metaphysics. Hölderlin’s poetry, Heidegger insists, “must stand entirely outside metaphysics, and thus outside the essential realm of Western art.”

In short, to read Hölderlin’s poetic word “authentically,” one must not read through the lens of metaphysics and, thereby, not through the conceptual apparatus of Western “aesthetics” (as in the “science” of art). On the contrary, following Heidegger’s guidance in his essay

15. In his “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indications of the Hermeneutical Situation,” Heidegger (370) claims: “The philosophy of today’s situation moves inauthentically within the Greek conceptuality […]. The basic concepts have lost their primordial functions of expression […]. But […] there remains a particular character of origin: these basic concepts still carry with them a part of the genuine tradition of their primordial meaning […].”

16. Following Hölderlin, Heidegger speaks of our time as ‘destinate’; see here Heidegger, “What are poets for?” (89).

17. One may take note here of Francesca Brencio’s (“Foundation and Poetry: Heidegger as a Reader of Hölderlin,” (195) somewhat critical observation that, “The meaning and limits of Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin have been thoroughly discussed by many scholars, according to a twofold evaluation of both the constitutive nature of Heidegger’s exegesis, and the legitimate emphasis on its merits. […] [It] appears obvious that Heidegger has built around the poet a framework biased by the constraints imposed by the issue of the meaning of Being. […] Thus, the ‘poetic thinking’ of the philosopher shapes an image of Hölderlin that is missing some crucial features, such as German romanticism and idealism as privileged sources of his lyrical education.” It is to be noted that Heidegger is guided by the Hellingrath translation of Hölderlin’s poems, influenced thus by Hellingrath’s estimate of Hölderlin as “der erste Verkünder des deutschen Schicksalsgeheimnisses,” i.e., “the first herald of Germany’s hidden fate.” See here Joseph Suglia, “On the Nationalist Reconstruction of Hölderlin in the George Circle,” German Life and Letters.


19. Grossman, “The Myth of Poetry,” 30. There are those critical of Heidegger’s appropriation of Hölderlin in a “nationalist” context at the time that National Socialism was emerging in Germany’s politics. See here, e.g., Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry. For a critical discussion of this, see Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall, Heidegger Reexamined: Art, Poetry, and Technology, especially p. 395.


25. Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,” (16) explains, αλληγορια [allegory] is a proclamation of something else by way of something, namely, by way of something familiar that can be experienced sensuously. Thus, in the case of Hölderlin’s attentiveness to the river, read as allegory one would read ‘river’ here allegorically as that which is experience sensuously, i.e., by way of our faculty of sensibility, but take this to be referring to something else not immediately evident.

on the origin of the work of art, we are to recall that he tells us it is the nature of poetry to found truth. Heidegger says, “We understand founding here in a triple sense: founding as bestowing, founding as grounding, and founding as beginning.”27 This founding thereby initiates a ground of history (Geschichte) as a beginning (Beginn) that proceeds from its origin (Ursprung).

Hence, if on turning to the origin we read Sophocles as Heidegger reads Hölderlin, recognizing Sophocles for the “great poet” that both Hölderlin and Heidegger take him to be, then we must take Sophocles’ poetic word to be founding for Western humanity in that triple sense. Inasmuch as he as poet “fore-tells,” he bestows; insofar as he bespeaks a “decision” manifest in his poetic word, he grounds; and inasmuch as that decision is taken, the poet tells us of the import of a beginning that yet governs our “time.” But it is Hölderlin, in his dialogue with Sophocles, that matters here; for, as Grossmann writes, “In the plights of history, he is the one who is necessary, the averter of danger, the one who makes ‘poetic dwelling’ possible […]”28 Thus, in our time of planetary danger, it is the poetizing of Hölderlin that, for Heidegger, holds the promise of averting the perils of escalating Promethean affirmations of the technological; for, it is this poetizing that opens the way to an other beginning in thought.

To read Heidegger reading the German poet Hölderlin reading the Greek poet Sophocles, then, is to immerse oneself in a thoughtful reflection, in a meditative thinking (besinnliche Denken) that may disclose this moment of vision and thus “unconceal” what is historically essential to Hölderlin’s word as he speaks of his own “encounter” (Auseinandersetzung) with the ancient Greek poets, as he continues the poetizing (Dichtung) that yet intimates what is essential to the future of Western humankind, essential to a “fitting” time yet to come.29 Attentive to the poet’s essential word, we respond to the call to hear, at the outset unprepared for what we are called to hear about what has vanished (die Schwindenden), viz, the origin (Ursprung), but a vanished origin that is nonetheless full of intimation (die Ahnungsvollen). In reading Heidegger reading Hölderlin for what is essential therein, one is not left merely with a “reproduction” of Heidegger’s “interpretation,” a word Heidegger declines to use and instead speaks of providing “remarks” (Anmerkungen) on Hölderlin’s poetic word.30 Rather, following Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics,31 one has a productive engagement of Heidegger’s text, and thereby of the poetic words of both Hölderlin and Sophocles, in which case one goes beyond what Heidegger himself says while we are nonetheless guided by his own manner of questioning. What follows here, therefore, cannot but be a productive encounter with the dialogue that ensues as Heidegger reads Hölderlin, as Hölderlin reads Sophocles, and as Heidegger reads Sophocles.

The Question of ‘Origin’ (Ursprung)

For Heidegger, “the timespace of that which is poetized” is not a function of its historiography but instead of its “spirit” (Geist). In this way, Hölderlin and Sophocles have their unity in what is essential to their poetic thinking. “For,” Heidegger tells us, “all essential poetry also poetizes ‘anew’ the essence of poetizing itself.”32 Hölderlin performs his Auseinandersetzung, we may say following Heidegger here, “to hear something distinctly significant” in the poetic word of the ancients. While doing so, he “await[s] a concealed fullness of poetic time and of its truth,” then awaits a moment of vision that is one of unconcealment (Unverborgenheit). Heidegger’s turn to Hölderlin itself intimates what is the task of thinking that the poetic word calls forth in this encounter, for, as Heidegger says, the poetic word “speaks into what has already been decided.”33 And, it is this fateful decision (Entscheidung) that unfolded the unique human destiny (Geschick) of Western humankind that decides our “time,” our “age.” It is in this way that the origin speaks to our present and future. For Heidegger, the poetic word provides the possibility of a different “measure”34 by no means calculative, thus a different decision to be taken for an “other” beginning that is in tension with that which was initiated by the ancient Greeks.

We respond to Heidegger’s later thinking as it is turned to the poet Hölderlin to appreciate the ineradicable and originary (ursprüngliche) significance of ancient Greek thought in post-modern (i.e., post-metaphysical) context. To say ‘originary’ here is to acknowledge, as Heidegger does, that we yet make our way about from out of the origin of thinking—deliberately not to say here “philosophy”—bequeathed to us from the ancient Greeks. This Denken must include the poets who also “think” and who, through their poetizing (Dichtung), “determine a time” (eine Zeit bestimmt).

27. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 72; emphasis added.
29. I am aware of the criticism that Heidegger does “violence” to Hölderlin’s text as he reads it and translates it even contrary to philological expectation. Heidegger himself acknowledges that his is a violent reading. I shall not engage this criticism directly here, inasmuch I attempt a thoughtful reflection according to the productive interpretation set forth here. For one such critical view of Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin, see Andrzej Warminski, “Monstrous History.”
30. Although Heidegger tells us that he offers remarks rather than an interpretation in the strict sense of the word, his “explication” of the meaning of the text has its hermeneutic guideline. Thus, e.g., he writes (126) that interpretation of Hölderlin’s poetry “depends, however, not only on our knowing the wording but on how essential a guiding view we have of what poetry history and truth are, and what is ‘in general and of what is experienced as being.’” This spells out Heidegger’s interpretive prejudice, his approach to Hölderlin’s texts in general, thus it being inevitable that his reading of Hölderlin reading Sophocles would manifest Heidegger’s central preoccupation in thought, i.e., the question of the meaning of being.
31. See here Gadamer’s Truth and Method and his Philosophical Hermeneutics.
Heidegger, therefore, listens most of all to Hölдерlin’s poetry as he reads Sophocles. It is Sophocles who discloses what is perhaps the most essential thought that must ever be thought meditatively, i.e., as a matter of the meditative thinking that, for Heidegger, is to be pitted against the calculative rationality that dominates our time:

πολλά τα δείνα κουδέν ανθρώπου
δενοτερον πέλει

[“Vielfältig das Unheimliche, nichts doch über den Menschen hinaus unheimlicher waltet.”]

[Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing beyond the human being prevails more uncannily.]

This poetic word from Sophocles—having what Heidegger would call a “distinctive intonation” (aUSgezeiclitlge Betonung), thus a profundity of the originary that nonetheless reaches into our present in its “historical essence” (geschichtliches Wesen)—is at the core of Heidegger’s own thoughtful encounter or “confrontation” with the ancient Greeks.

With these words, Sophocles tells—and fore-tells, thus decides for the historicity of Western humankind—“the most uncanny ‘essence’ of the human being.” As Heidegger puts it, “poetizing” not only determines a time, but it fore-tells something: “To tell something that, prior to this, has not yet been told. A properly unique beginning [ein eigener Beginn] thus lies in whatever is said poetically.” It is this decision that we—we who are now “here” to hearken what Sophocles said, and still says to us—are called to understand. Concerning ‘decision,’ Heidegger claims:

“What is decision here [in our epoch]? What is ownmost to decision is determined by what is ownmost to crossing from modernity into what is other than modernity.” Heidegger seeks a crossing from modernity, which includes the present age of technology, into another beginning. He sees the danger of the technological in a sense more fundamental than given in the concept of technology as something merely instrumental and anthropological, according to which conceptions technologies are subject to human control. Thinking fundamentally, then, Heidegger warns: “The danger has grown to the extreme, since everywhere there is uprooting and—what is even more disastrous—because the uprooting is already engaged in hiding itself, the beginning of the lack of history is already here.”

Hence, heedful of the danger, we are called to understand what is uncanny about the human being, aware thus of the fundamental determination of Western humanity, i.e., its basic concepts and their unfolding onward into the present century’s dominance of planetary technology. This requires an overcoming (Überwindung) of metaphysics. In relation to the origin of the work of art, Heidegger (1999, 354-355) tells us:

Overcoming of metaphysics is, however, not discarding the hitherto existing philosophy but rather the leap into its first beginning, without wanting to renew this beginning—something that remains historically [historisch] unreal and historically [geschichtlich] impossible. Nevertheless, mindfulness of the first beginning (out of the pressing need for preparing for the other beginning) leads to distinguishing inceptual (Greek) thinking, which favors the misunderstanding that by this retrospective observation a kind of “classicism” in philosophy might be what one is striving for. But in truth, with the “retrieving” question that begins more originarily, the solitary remoteness of the first beginning opens out to everything that follows it historically. In the end the other beginning stands in a necessary and intimate but hidden relation to the first beginning…

This speaks to us of what is yet part of our task in “essential thinking” (wesentliche Denken) today, as if “standing out” (ek-sistent) from the present of our place and time into our future and following Höllderlin’s imagery of the river in “The Ister,” we, too, turn back to our source, to the origin from out of which the first beginning set itself forth in thought, word, and deed.

Heidegger’s turn to Höllderlin serves to remind us that, as Charles Bambach observed, “Höllderlin, as poet and as thinker, stands at the threshold of modernity. That is, he stands over an epoch whose birth and genesis was marked by the trauma of revolutionary violence and political upheaval […] Höllderlin crafted his poetic verse as a response to what he perceived as an age of revolutionary transformation. Writing at this threshold, Höllderlin would come to understand his own epoch as an age of transition between the lost power of ancient Greek tragic art […] and] a new epochal time of

35. Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn, “The Ister,” 52. Ralph Mannheim, translating the verse as it is given in Heidegger’s An Introduction to Metaphysics, states it thus: “There is much that is strange, but nothing that surpasses man in strangeness.” This translation likewise fits the essential concern of being unhomely, being “estranged” from the homely. Taking note that Heidegger’s translation of the verse into German is different from that of Höllderlin, Warmink (“Monstrous History,” 196 comments): “Höllderlin translates the opening of the choral ode by rendering the Greek not as unheimlich but as ungeheuer: Ungeheuer ist viel. Doch nichts Ungeheuer als der Mensch. Much is monstrous. But nothing more monstrous than man.” In his reading of “The Ister,” Heidegger, of course, is aware of Hölderlin’s translation of the Antigone (published in 1804), the English translation given (p. 70) as: “there is much that is extraordinary, yet nothing more extraordinary than the human being.” But even then, this translation Heidegger (p. 70) takes to be a more mature translation than that Hölderlin provides in 1801: “Vieler gewaltige giebts. Doch nichts ist gewaltiger, als der Mensch.” “There is much that is powerful. Yet nothing is more powerful than the human being.”


37. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, §44, 63.

38. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, §89, 124, identifies Nietzsche as the philosopher heralding the end, i.e., completion, of the Western tradition of metaphysics. “To grasp Nietzsche as the end of Western metaphysics is not a historical [historisch] statement about what lies behind us but the historical [geschichtlich] onset of the future of Western thinking.”


freedom and justice.” But, more than this, Bambach adds, “Above all, Hölderlin was committed to an idealized vision of ancient Greece as the site for the spiritual origin of the West. For him ‘Greece’ was less the space of a geographical location than it was the name for an experience of absence, one marked by exile from, and mourning for, a possibility of authentic poetic dwelling. What Hölderlin attempts in his poetry is a complex retrieval of a Greek experience that never happened, of a vision of originary beauty whose power is not historical but futural.”

Heidegger understands the beginning that was initiated in ancient Greece for what it is, a commencement that is not merely past but a movement in word, thought, and deed that speaks to us of “that which is coming and futural in what has first been as the commencement.” We stand in a moment, “waiting” what is coming. This awaiting is to be thought not as a passively standing about but rather as “action [Handeln] in the realm of the essential.” What is required of us is care in the sense of a solicitude that “leaps ahead” (vorspringende Fürsorge) of our present while “standing within what is indestructible.” For insight into this leap-ahead solicitude Heidegger listens to “the poetic dialogue between Hölderlin and Sophocles.” Hölderlin’s “turning back” to Sophocles is a return to the origin from out of which “a commencement once occurred [hat sich ereignet] in the Greek world” this commencement grounding the history (Geschichte) of Western humankind and speaking to us today through Hölderlin’s poetizing.

The words here are entirely momentous; for, our turning back to the source, if it is successful, accomplishes something future, viz., a properly unique beginning that, having returned from the origin, initiates a “second” beginning other than what was initiated in the philosophical thought of Plato and Aristotle (the latter yet governing the quest for planetary ordering that promises a thoroughly technocratic world order). “Then”—at that “time”—when that second beginning is initiated, we might also say, ‘we have arrived from far’ (in Hölderlin’s poetic word— “her Fernangekommen…”), i.e., from “afar,” from the origin. And, hence, it is in Heidegger’s turn to Hölderlin that we may find our way into an appropriation of a poetic word that is necessary for “our age,” hence a task about which we may not be indifferent if it is recognized as “properly necessary” (eigentliche Notwendigkeit), i.e., necessary for us severally and jointly.

Heidegger on the Task of ‘Becoming Homely’

In §9 of Hölderlin’s “The Ister,” Heidegger speaks of Hölderlin’s poetry having its own “care” (Sorge), which he describes as “becoming homely” (das Heimischwerden). One draws an immediate connection of this word to “das Unheimliche,” translating Sophocles’ word (τα δεινα). For Heidegger, τα δεινα, das Unheimliche, “the uncanny,” is not only the fundamental word of Sophocles’ choral ode; it is the fundamental word “of this tragedy [Antigone] and even of Greek antiquity itself.” Since, in following Hölderlin, Heidegger is concerned with the possibility of dialogue between the foreign and one’s own in its significance for becoming homely, we are therefore to heed his guiding remark as he reflects upon the poet’s word: “If becoming homely belongs essentially to historicality,—and we may accept this antecedent as “true” — “then a historical people can never come to satisfy its essence of its own accord or directly within its own language” (taking the consequent here as likewise true). He continues: “A historical people is only from the dialogue between its language and foreign languages.” The historical people that concerns both Heidegger and Hölderlin are the Germans, the German language thus in dialogue with the classical Greek language given in the poetic word of Sophocles. But, in question here is Western humankind (thus not only the German people), but thereby to “recognize the singular essence of Greek world.”

Hölderlin manifests his care in and through his poetic word, and in this way he himself seeks to become homely. But, Hölderlin’s word is not merely his own, since such an appropriation must follow from an “enactment” that returns to the source, i.e., to the origin. And, more importantly, it is precisely this kind of enactment that we in our own “time” are expected to undertake, if we are to accomplish our own becoming homely despite the decision taken in that beginning that set us forth along a path upon which we yet find ourselves unhomely rather than having become homely.

Heidegger situates this “becoming homely” in what he calls “the encounter between the foreign and one’s own,” with the additional and equally essential words that this kind of encounter is to be understood as “the fundamental truth of history” (die Grundwahrheit der Geschichte). For Heidegger, such an encounter is to be found in Hölderlin’s “dialogue” with the ancient Greek poets Pindar and Sophocles, but especially the latter, hence Heidegger’s engagement of Sophocles’ Antigone through his own en-

42. Bambach, “Poetry at the Threshold,” 132.
44. Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,” 55.
47. One means “true” here in the context of Heidegger’s complex elucidation of the history of being (Seinsgeschichte) that he takes to govern the Western philosophical tradition since its explicit beginning in the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle.
counter with Hölderlin. But, Hölderlin’s dialogue *qua* enactment of this encounter accomplishes what is exemplary for those who follow him in his thinking; for, in this dialogue with Sophocles, Hölderlin finds what is *his own*, thus *appropriating* what he has found as his own. What precisely is “his own” remains concealed to us except insofar as we situate Hölderlin in the setting of the Occident, thus in the historicality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of Western humanity. Further, we may interpret this with reference to Heidegger’s claim in *Being and Time* that, “Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the full and authentic historizing [*Geschichten*] of Dasein.”

We understand Hölderlin thus as one having his fateful destiny in and with his generation, but as a poet having a destiny that transcends that of his generation insofar as his poetic word emerges from his encounter with the origin and opens up the possibility of another beginning.

In short, it seems that from Heidegger’s words, taken in their juxtaposition, one cannot understand the concept, sentiment, or event of “becoming homely” except with reference to an encounter between “the foreign” (*Fremden*) and “one’s own” (*Eigenen*). All of this is by no means immediately clear. We are faced with the task of clarifying what Heidegger means by ‘becoming homely,’ by ‘encounter,’ by ‘the foreign,’ by ‘one’s own,’ by ‘the fundamental truth of history,’ and by ‘dialogue.’ How is one to proceed here?

We may begin by considering what Heidegger says earlier in his remarks, insofar as these remarks identify the conceptual and historical context that concerns Heidegger in his reading of Hölderlin. In §8 of this text, Heidegger opines that, “Space and time comprise the framework for our calculative domination and ordering of the ‘world’ as nature and history.” Heidegger thereby points to the dominance of calculative rationality ordering the “world”—a concept that includes reference to the whole of nature but also the whole of history in the sense of both what happens in history and the writing of history (*historiography, Historiet*). As humans we understand ourselves to have our being in a world (hence Heidegger’s concept of “Being-in-the-world,” *in-der-Welt-sein*), and this world involves both our relation to nature and to history. ‘World’ here is to be understood initially in Heidegger’s sense clarified in *Being and Time*, i.e., as a “context of significance” (*Bedeutsamkeit*) according to which we understand our own “ek-sistence,” attending to our ownmost or most proper possibilities of being as we “ek-sist” (“stand out”) in time beyond our extant present, but also the “existence” of other beings—things of “nature” such as flora and fauna, towards which we comport ourselves as we denominate them things present-at hand (*Vorhandensein*) or as things “equipmental” or “resources” ready-to-hand (*Zuhandensein*).

Invariably, we seek to understand the “place” or “site” (*topos*) of our own ek-sistence, conceived to be in nature, i.e., upon this planet “Earth” conceived as “environing world” (*Umwelt*) and as “lived-world” (*Lebenswelt*), in a particular house, this particular village, town, city, State, etc.; but, more vitally, as having a “home” or “homeland” (*Heimat*) in which one is “autochthonous” (*Bodenständigkeit*), i.e., having what Heidegger calls a “rootedly-capable homeland” (*wurzel-kraftige Heimat*). Furthermore, we seek to understand our ek-sistence in history, i.e., in this particular day that is situated in a particular “epoch” or “age”—as in “Greek antiquity,” “modernity,” “the Renaissance,” the “Enlightenment,” “postmodernity,” the “Age of Technology”—our “lived time” thus to be understood in Heidegger’s sense in which we have both our historicity (*Historialität*) and temporality (*Temporalität*).

In what he calls our “Age of the World Picture” (*die Zeit des Weltbild*) with reference to “the novelty of modern technolo-gy” (*das Neuartige der modernen Technik*), we find Heidegger characterizing this as a time of “pervasive measurement of the world in a calculative, discovering, and conquering manner.” Steeped in our calculative mode of thinking, venturing forth across the global terrain to discover, the human conquers where he wills so to do. This is all “undertaken by modern human beings in a way whose distinctive metaphysical feature is modern machine technology.”

What the purpose or direction of this pervasive measurement is, Heidegger wonders, is itself in doubt: whether this “serves merely to bring about a position within the planet as a whole that secures this humanity a suitable ‘living space’ for its lifetime, or whether such securing of space and time is intrinsically determined in such a far-reaching manner as to attain new possibilities of this procedure of conquering space and of time-lapse and to intensify this procedure.” More importantly, for

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50. I have engaged Heidegger’s attention to Sophocles’ *Antigone* elsewhere (Swazo, “Preserving the Ethos: Heidegger and Sophocles’ *Antigone*” (2006) and refer interested readers to that paper rather than rehearse that interpretation here.


52. Heidegger, Hölderlin’s *Hymn ‘The Ister*,” 48.

53. Michael Murray, ‘The Question of Being and Time’ (13-57) provides a succinct clarification in writing of “historicity” (*Geschichtlichkeit*), “historiography” (*Historie*), and “history proper” (*Geschichte*): (i) *Historicity* is the fundamental structure constitutive of the being of man and grounded in temporal being-in-the-world. Temporality is understood as the temporalizing unity of past, present, and future. Grounded in temporalizing, historicity is the domain of the phenomenology of historical existence, (ii) *Historiography* may be defined as the discipline and science of the writing of history; in short, the work and methods of historians of all sorts. Historiography must be rooted in a general concept of science which presupposes and is possible only for an historical being such as man. (iii) *History* most properly speaking is the eventuation of those most basic epochs in which Being is necessarily revealed and/or concealed. Heidegger calls history in this sense *Seinsgeschichte* or Being-as-History. For a further overview of the attention to history in late nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophy, see Leslie Paul Thieke “Review: Heidegger, History, and Hermeneutics.”

54. For an informative discussion of Heidegger’s concept here see Robert Metcalf, “Rethinking Bodenständigkeit’ in the Technological Age.”


Heidegger, insofar as this situation is evaluated metaphysically, “it remains undecided whether, and in what way, this will to planetary ordering will set itself its own limit.”

This is the essential obstacle with calculative thinking: it is oblivious of any limit to human endeavors despite the finitude of human knowledge and the elusiveness of ontological and epistemological certainty. Citing Hölderlin’s attentiveness to “the river,” Heidegger reminds us that the poet says in his “The Voice of the People” (Stimme des Volkes) that the river rushes on “unconcerned with our wisdom” (unser Weisheit unbekümmert). This is an enigma even as the relation of that which vanishes and that which is full of intimation is enigmatic, hence a challenge to human wisdom. The challenge for us today is to discern this enigmatic relation precisely because, as Heidegger instructs, “Both are, at the same time, in a concealed, unitary relation to what has been and what is of the future—thus to the temporal!”57 If we are to speak presumptively, we may take note of Heidegger’s reminder that a river is a “distinctive and significant locale at which human beings, though not only human beings, find their dwelling place.”58 Thus, to attend to the poetic word about the river is to attend to its essential significance as a place of gathering. What matters here is what humans are to accomplish thereby—to dwell. This is what we are called to hear in the poet’s thinking as he speaks to our future after having turned back from the source, from the origin.

Heidegger recognizes the enigma in the poet’s word and, thereby, utters a cautionary note: “If the Greek world has its own historical singularity, then it can never in any respect be repeated in an imitative sense.”59 When Hölderlin accomplishes his encounter of the foreign, obtains his insight into the origin and then turns back, he does not do so with the purpose of imitating the Greek historical singularity, i.e., what we know as “the first beginning” of Western philosophical thinking. No, instead, the poet “fore-tells” in intimation of beginning anew. Thus, if we anticipate a second beginning that does not imitate the Greek historical singularity but truly begins anew, then what it means to dwell is other than what has been transmitted to us in the conceptual framework of classical Greek political thought. Perhaps it is to be said that Heidegger attempts to unconceal the meaning of a different allegory, found in the imagery of the river as the gathering place for human beings in their quest to dwell. After all, as Heidegger relates, “αλληγορια [allegory] is a proclamation of something else by way of something, by way of something familiar that can be experienced sensuously [i.e., by way of our senses].”60 But one must consider Hölderlin’s attentiveness to the river as gathering place.

In its usual everyday conception, ‘dwelling’ means that which one inhabits or possesses as accommodation, housing. Heidegger is quick to tell us, however, that Hölderlin thinks more essentially: “Dwelling takes on an abode and is an abiding in such an abode, specifically that of human beings upon this earth.”61 The point of such dwelling, therefore, is not merely to abide in some physical place, such as when one says one finds one’s rest in one’s house. Rather, Heidegger clarifies, “Rest is a grounded repose in the steadfastness of one’s own essence.” Note the words spoken here—‘grounded’; ‘steadfastness’; ‘one’s own’. These words call out to us to hear what is of concern to Hölderlin. When a human being dwells, s/he accomplishes and persists in a grounded repose—not in some “actual” place that is this or that house or even this or that city in the classical and modern senses. The repose occurs “in” or “where” or “when” one finds “one’s own essence”; and, in that finding one persists in a resolve that is steadfast, attentive to one’s own essence to remain in this grounded repose.

But, importantly, Hölderlin writes: “Here”—at the river as gathering place—“however, we wish to build.” This desire “to build” seeks its fulfillment—the human to have a steadfast grounded repose, but also to build. What is one to build? How is one to build? Heidegger intimates what is unconcealed yet concealed in the word of the poet:

The river “is” the locality that pervades the abode of human beings upon the earth, determines them to where they belong and where they are homely [heimisch]. The river thus brings human beings into their own and maintains them in what is their own. Whatever is their own is that to which human beings belong and must belong if they are to fulfill whatever is destined to them, and whatever is fitting, as their specific way of being. Yet that which is their own often remains foreign to human beings for a long time, because they abandon it without having appropriated it. And human beings abandon what is their own because it is what most threatens to overwhelm them. One’s own is least of all something that produces itself of its own accord. One’s own must come to be appropriate. And in turn, whatever has become appropriate needs to be appropriated. All this is true only on the presupposition that initially human beings are not and indeed never “of themselves,” or through any self-making, in that which is their own. In that case, however, to dwell in what is one’s own is what comes last and is seldom successful and always remains what is most difficult.62
The human quest is to have a steadfast repose in what is homely, thus for human beings to have their ownmost "fitting" place. But, for long time—"in the first beginning and since "then"—the human has abandoned the "place" that is fitting for him as human being. Venturing forth, seeking repose yet risking all (including his own manner of being), he is not steadfast in his building and hence does not dwell in a fitting way.

The river, Hölderlin tells us, dwells "beautifully" in its journey, in its vanishing back to its source and in flowing forth full of intimation. It becomes homely through that journey, being both "here" and "there," in the "here" of its becoming homely and in the "there" of its origin and its onward becoming that is at once unconcealed and concealed in its intimation, hence its enigma (Rätsel). The river is enigmatic inasmuch as, "The river is at once locality and journeying in a concealed and originary unity."63 Heidegger opines that, "Locale and journey belong together like 'space and time.'" That said, however, Heidegger cautions against a technological conceptualization of "space-time" as we seek to understand the poetic insight that locale and journey belong together. Hence he says: "We do not need to refer at great length to the achievements of the technological era or the world picture belonging to it in order to show that we 'get the picture' about the 'spatio-temporal world,' and that via our calculations and machinery, we have such convincing power over its 'spaces' and 'times' that the space of our planet is shrinking and the annual seasons and years of human life are being condensed into diminutive numerical values for the purposes of our calculative planning far in advance."64

In short, Heidegger's caution turns us away from calculative thinking if we are to discern the enigma in Hölderlin's poetic thought. We are not to understand 'locale' and 'journey' reflectively. Rather, the poetic word calls for our thoughtful reflection, i.e., our meditative thinking; for, it is only through such thoughtful reflection that we may appreciate what is essential (because it is both originary and full of intimation, thus futural)—and thus what is other than mere "value" for calculative planning as human beings traverse the planet yet fail to apprehend the essence of poetic dwelling. The technocratic order of calculative planning as human beings traverse the planet yet fail to apprehend the essence of poetic dwelling. The technocratic order of calculative planning is far removed from all poetic dwelling; for, thoughtful reflection—all meditative (besinnliche) and essential (wesentliche) thinking—is "higher than" calculative thinking, inasmuch as, thus Heidegger remarks, 'order' means here "calculable and ordered rationality."65 This rationality concerns itself only with a technological efficacy—"The only thing that is ever questionable is how we can measure and fathom and exploit the world as quickly as possible, as securely as possible, and as completely as possible."66 Yet, again it must be said, such calculative efficacy is far removed from the accomplishment sought in poetic dwelling. The former seeks to produce results; the latter seeks an essential repose.

So, it will not do to think Hölderlin's poetic word calculatively, i.e., by way of a calculative rationality that conceives of locale and journey spatio-temporally. Speaking presumptively, Heidegger offers his guidance: "we must presumably learn to look toward the historicality of human beings and its essential ground if we wish to grasp the essential scope of the river and its fullness."67 Hence, we have before us a task of thoughtful reflection, viz., to understand this historicality (Geschichtlichkeit) of human beings, i.e., that essential history that belongs to us, but also and at the same "time" to understand the "essential ground" (Wesensgrund) of this historicality. For Heidegger, at issue here is "we" human beings who belong to that "history" that discloses "the essence of Western humankind" (das Wesen des abendländischen Menschentums).68

To think this essence is to think of the human being in the "essential relations" of human ek-sistence: "the relation to world, the relation to earth, the relation to the gods and to alternative gods and false gods."69 One cannot apprehend what it is for Western humanity to become homely without discerning the import of these essential relations in what Heidegger calls their "enigmatic unity." This essential unity is to be thought, however, not merely in terms of the historicality of Western humankind; for, at issue in "The Ister" is the encounter between the foreign and one's own. If what we seek is to dwell beautifully, as does the river, then we must be mindful that the contemporary process of globalization is such that it "covers over," as Heidegger says, "to a large extent the 'misery' into which human beings are thrust by technologization,"70 thus by "the will to planetary ordering."71 To pit our meditative thinking against calculative thinking is to anticipate that the will to planetary ordering does not promise planetary dwelling, i.e., what Hölderlin intimates as the task of "becoming homely in what is one's own."

Returning, then, to §9 of Heidegger's remarks on "The Ister," we recall the central discussion of the encounter between the foreign and one's own that Heidegger sees to be the fundamental truth of history. If Heidegger is correct that, "Coming to

70. Heidegger, Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister," 44.
be at home is thus a passage through the foreign.” Then we today cannot ignore this passage through the foreign as if it were inconsequential or that we could remain indifferent to this task. Heidegger presents the bare outline of an argument for us to ponder: “And if the becoming homely of a particular humankind sustains the historicality of its history, then the law of the encounter between the foreign and one’s own is the fundamental truth of history, a truth from out of which the essence of history must emerge itself. For this reason,” Heidegger continues, “the poetic meditation on becoming homely must also for its part be of a historical nature and, as poetic, demand a historical dialogue [Zwiesprache] with foreign poets.”

Central to Heidegger’s engagement of Hölderlin’s poetic word is his understanding that Hölderlin’s “poetic meditation and telling is concerned with finding and appropriating [what is one’s own].” But as with Hölderlin this is a matter of engaging the classical Greek poets, and so we must do likewise if we are to clarify what is incomprehensible, i.e., enigmatic, in Hölderlin’s poetic word in due time to find and appropriate what is our own. It is, therefore, entirely salient that in Part Two of his remarks on Hölderlin’s “The Ister” Heidegger examines and reflects upon what he calls “the Greek interpretation of human beings,” and this not in Plato’s dialogues or Aristotle’s treatises but in Sophocles’ Antigone. The key to this interpretation Heidegger finds in a choral ode of that tragedy. In this ode a poetic word was spoken, which is to say more precisely and in all import, that a decision (Entscheidung) was taken, a decision fateful for the Greeks and essential for the destiny of Western humankind since the beginning of that tradition of thought:

Πολλα τα δεινα κουδεν ανθρωπου
Δεινοτερον πελει.

Heidegger (1996a, 57-58), as we noted earlier, provides the German text qua interpretation:

Vielfältig das Unheimlichen nichts
doch
Über den Menschen hinaus unheimli-
cher waltet.

Again, in the English translation:

Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing beyond the human being prevails more uncannily.75

“The uncanny”—das Unheimli-
che—such is the human being, one who is strange, estranged, thus unhomely, despite all his “venturing forth,” despite all his “ingenious” ways to bend the earth to his will, despite his labor to “produce” his settlements and his “courageous governance of the towns” (der Herrschaft über die Städte). Yet: “Überall hinausfahrend unterwegs erfahrunglos ohne Ausweg kommt er zum Nichts” (“Everywhere venturing forth underway, experienceless without any way out he comes to nothing.”)76

The choral ode concerns this uncanniness of the human being who, despite all his productive labor, comes to nothing, having throughout all his venturing forth remained unhomely. It remains so today, as the human being of modernity has ventured forth with his calculative rationality, advancing the power of technology for a planetary ordering seemingly without limit and without evident purpose, and even without the semblance of any ecological imperative. From the beginning onward into the present of “the age of the world picture,” “the age of technology,” this uncanny human being has ventured forth—for what? “...for the sake of risk,” the poet says: ‘risk,’ der Wagnis, τολμα. In venturing forth the human being “forefeits the site” of his being (verlustig der Stätte ist er), becomes unhomely (in the Greek: απολις), all for the sake of τολμα.

But what does the human being risk in abandoning the “site” of his being? He risks the fateful decision that is ever-present for him, viz., whether he will remain unhomely or become homely. A decision hitherto was made. That is the insight of the poet’s word spoken from out of the origin in Sophocles’ Antigone, as both Hölderlin and Heidegger understand. “Then, at that “time,” the decision taken set Western humankind along manifold ways of being unhomely, even as he has arrived at the “time” of ordering the whole of Earth to his productive use, as if all such productive planning and global settlement could and would give him his “home.” For all this, he remains uncanny, “estranged” from the homely, lacking in the essential action of becoming homely. In and for his calculative rationality, the human “gathers” the whole of being into a planetary order. This is a gathering not in Hölderlin’s sense but one that conforms to the “technologization” of Earth. Reading Heidegger, Albert Hostadter explained, we are gathered to the end of putting “everything that discloses itself into the position of stock, resource, material for technological processing.”77 The implication is disturbing, as Hofstadter adds: “Contemporary man’s technological ‘things’ bear his technological ‘world’ in their own distorted way—distorting man’s earth, his heaven, his divinities, and, in the end, himself and his mortality.” Such productive distortion is by no means the equivalent of the accomplishment the poetic word seeks, viz., to dwell beautifully on the earth with care.

The question, then, is how he is to perform this essential action. Heidegger discloses the way when he tells us that what is most thought-provoking in this, our thought-provoking “time,” is that we are not yet thinking—not yet, but an action that is manifestly possible. This he has told us, which we can appropriate in juxtaposition to his statement that think-

73. Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,” 49.
77. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 84.
ing is the essential action. “We attain to dwelling, so it seems, only by means of building. The latter, building, has the former, dwelling, as its goal.”

But, the building (verbal sense here) that has dwelling (verbal sense here) for its goal is not the self-assertive production of calculative planning. Further, Heidegger corrects this former remark by moving us to think of the “essential relation” of building and dwelling rather than conceive a means-end schema. Problematic to the modern conception is that “dwelling is not experienced as man’s being; dwelling is never thought of as the basic character of human being.”

But if we are to appropriate dwelling as our basic character—and do so in contrast to modernity’s characterization of humanity as Homo faber (in its Latin sense that asserts unequivocally “Homo faber suae quisque fortuneae,” i.e., “Every man is the architect of his own fortune”)—then we realize the significance of Sophocles’ “fore-telling” and Hölderlin’s “intimation” as Heidegger sought to explicate: “In our translation,” Heidegger clarified, “the word [Unheimliche, uncanny] is to be conceived in a more originary way. The uncanny means that which is not ‘at home’, not homely within whatever is homely […]. Being unhomely is no mere deviance from the homely, but rather the converse: a seeking and searching out the homely, a seeking that at times does not know itself. This seeking shies at no danger and no risk.” It is with these words in mind that we are to consider Hölderlin’s attentiveness to the “venturing forth” that Sophocles narrates.

Recalling the above, we consider that, despite the complexity of Heidegger’s lifelong quest to clarify “the meaning of being (Sein/Seyn),” there remains the singular simplicity of the fact that he ever calls into question our comportment (das Verhalten) towards and involvement with beings—towards human beings when we conceive them merely as “present-at-hand” (vorhanden) “rational animals,” the unity of their animality and rationality, however, as yet undetermined; towards nature with all of its diverse flora and fauna, all reduced to “things ready-to-hand” (Zuhandensein), thus as “resources.” It matters to the manner of human dwelling whether our comportment lets beings be, releasing them—Heidegger uses the term Gelassenheit—to what they are, how they naturally are, without being exposed, transposed, reposed, disposed, according to this or that and productive utility that accords with human “mastery” of the earth. It is for humans a daily task to discern what is fitting (das Schickliche) for the manner of being of all beings and to let them be fitting, thus to have their proper locality, their ownmost dwelling, in the site of their own being. Accordingly, Heidegger reminds: “the human being is the one who is open for what is fitting and the one who, in being human, is pointed toward what is fittingly destined [dem Geschick].”

Hölderlin complained of our “human, too human” mania, of lack of due care to what is fitting, when he wrote in “Hyperion’s Fate Song” (Hyperion’s Schikaalsied) —taking it here out of verse and presenting it as prose: “But it’s our fate to have no place to rest as suffering mortals blindly fall and vanish from one hour to the next like water falling from cliff to cliff, downward for years to uncertainty.” Like the water, like the river, he said. The analogy is salient. Key to Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin’s “The Ister” is his assertion that, “The river is the journeying of human beings as historical in their coming to be at home upon this earth.” But, he rephrases his claim to say: “The river is the journeying of a historical coming to be at home at the locale of this locality.” The course of the river is representative of the course of Western humanity’s historicality since its beginning in Greek antiquity.

For Hölderlin such is the fate (Schicksal) of human beings who, risking themselves (i.e., risking their essence), “blindly fall,” i.e., have their historicality while oblivious of their fate and their destiny as they venture forth and come to nothing (das Nichts), to uncertainty (die Unsicherheit), despite the long vanished “rubble of antiquity” and modernity’s insistence on having an absolute and unshakeable foundation in the certitude of being and knowing (fundamentum absolutum inconcussum veritatis). And what then does the poet say?

But you still shine, sun of heaven! You still green, holy earth! Still the rivers rush into the sea, and shady trees whisper in the height of day. Spring’s blissful song sings my mortal thoughts to sleep. The plenitude of the all-living world nourishes and fills with drunkenness my starving spirit.

Such was the view of Hölderlin in his early years (1797, 1799), which contrasts to the uncertainty of his later years when he asked in his posthumously published poem, “In Lovely Blue” (In lieblicher Blaue): “Giebt es auf Erden ein Maass? Es giebt keines” (“Is there on earth a measure?
There is none.”). The youthful Hölderlin sang the praises of nature, as in the words of Hyperion: “To be one with everything that lives, to return in blissful self-oblivion into the all of nature, that is the summit of thoughts and joys [...].” To accomplish this “unity,” however, requires that “virtue lays aside its wrathful harness, the mind of man its sceptre [...].” Such was the young Hölderlin’s intimation of the kind of comportment that is required of Western humanity.

The challenge in this poetic word is to contemporary technological man—to lay aside his wrathful harnessing of all things, to set aside his presumption to mastery of the Earth, to accept a primordial covenant with all beings, thus to “make beautiful the world.” Such a “thought” sets aside all calculative rationality in favor of Gelassenheit, releasement of beings into their own manner of being. Yet, to do this is difficult if it remains unclear whether there is yet a measure on the Earth; for, as Hyperion said to Bellarmín, it takes but “a moment of reflection” for him to be cast down from the height of blessed thought: “I begin to think, and find myself as I was before, alone, with all the pains of mortality, and my heart’s sanctuary, the world’s oneness, is no more; nature’s arms are closed, and I stand before her like a stranger and cannot comprehend her.”

The “I” here is none other than the human who, as the most uncanny of beings, stands in the midst of nature estranged and thus finds the essential yet primordial covenant with beings incomprehensible. The human being in time becomes the self-assertive ego, the self-affirming ‘I’ who thereby becomes unhomely: “Amongst you I became so very rational, learnt to distinguish myself perfectly from what is around me, and now I’m set apart in the beautiful world, expelled from the garden of nature in which I grew and bloomed, and shiver under the noonday sun.” Such is the consequence of the modern mind’s drive for an indubitable subjectivity that ever seeks to possess its “objectivity.” Yet, from antiquity to modernity, there is only privation: “What is loss when man thus finds himself in a world which is his own?” Hyperion asks. In his youthful demeanor, Hölderlin (2015, 15) states his stern judgment: “But let no one say it’s fate that parts us! It’s we, we ourselves who do it! [We] take our delight in plunging into the night of the unknown, into the cold alien terrain of some other world, and were it possible, we would quit the sun’s realm and storm beyond the bonds of our wandering star. Alas! for man’s wild breast there can be no home [...].”

Such is the quest of he who has himself become the “technicized animal” (technisierte Tier), already in our day daring to wield the instrumental power of his Promethean technology not only to endanger this planet to the point of total ecological decay but with an even greater hubris to abandon it after having produced a wasteland. Yet, perhaps not so easily does the poet escape the press of fate. In a parting blessing, Hyperion’s “father” Adamas told him: “There is a god in us; he added more calmly, ‘who steers our fate like rivers of water, and all things are his element. Be this god with you above all!” The problem of lack of measure for the later Hölderlin is precisely the lack of such a god. “But if,” David Kleinberg-Levin writes, “in these dark times, the gods have abandoned us, if their spirit will no longer inhabit our hearts, then it seems that the hope expressed elsewhere is here utterly shattered. In many writings, the poet leaves little doubt that he can see nothing but a tragic freedom of will, and misery spreading across the land—land once favored, and now abandoned, by the gods.”

Heidegger’s words of 23 September 1966, given in an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel and posthumously published on 31 May 1976 under the title, “Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten” (“Only a god can save us...”)

87. David Michael Kleinberg-Levin, Gestures of Ethical Life: Reading Hölderlin’s Question of Measure After Heidegger (21-22) comments: “‘There is none’ means for the poet, that the people are living in a time of banishment, abandoned by the gods. But if it also means, as his writings clearly tell us, that the people are living in a time of unbearable hardship, inexusable injustice, and extreme forms of political repression, one could perhaps speak of a ‘state of exception’ (Ausnahmezustand), understanding this word [...] as indicating a crisis that opens up an exceptional time for something new to emerge.”

88. Hölderlin, Hyperion, or the Hermit in Greece, 8.

89. Hölderlin, Hyperion, or the Hermit in Greece, 9.

90. Hölderlin, Hyperion, or the Hermit in Greece, 9; italics added.

91. Hölderlin, Hyperion, or the Hermit in Greece, 9.

92. See, e.g., historian of science Charles Coulston Gillispie’s The Edge of Objectivity: An Essay in the History of Scientific Ideas. In Chapter 3, “The New Philosophy,” Gillispie writes: “The thought of René Descartes moved across the gap in the scientific revolution between the physics of Galileo and the prophecies of Bacon. In its success it complemented each. In its failure it announced the need for a scientific declaration of independence from philosophy.” In his review of Gillispie’s “founding document” in the new history of science, Stephen Toulmin (1961) characterizes Gillispie’s central thesis: “The crucial thing about the modern scientific movement for him is the pursuit of ‘objectivity’, which means to him, the solid intellectual security brought to empirical inquiry by the use of numerical measurement and mathematical analysis.”

93. Hölderlin, Hyperion’s Fate, 14.

94. Hölderlin, Hyperion’s Fate, 15.

95. Keng, ambassador from Terra (Earth), in science fiction author Ursula K. LeGuin’s The Dispossessed, 306-307, describes Earth’s future with unmistakable and portentous clarity: “My world, my Earth, is a ruin. A planet spoiled by the human species. We multiplied and gobbled and fought until there was nothing left, and then we died. We controlled neither appetite nor violence; we did not adapt. We destroyed ourselves. But we destroyed the world first. [...] We failed as a species, as a social species. [...] Well, we had saved what could be saved, and made a kind of life in the ruins, on Terra [...].”

now”), leave Hölderlin’s disquiet about “the flight of the gods” (Flucht der Götter), i.e., of the gods that have been (gewesenen Götter), an open question. There he said: “Only a god can save us. The only possibility available to us is that by thinking and poetizing we prepare a readiness for the appearance of a god, or for the absence of a god in [our] decline, insofar as in view of the absent god we are in a state of decline” (emphasis added). Thus, Heidegger intimates a role for both thinking (Denken) and poetizing (Dichtung) in preparing for the possible appearance of “a god” (not to think here monotheistically). He adds, “I see the situation of man in the world of planetary technicity not as an inextricable and inescapable destiny, but I see the task of thought in this, that within its own limits it helps man as such achieve a satisfactory relationship to the essence of technicity” (emphasis added).

This relationship is yet possible in pitting meditative thinking and the word of the poet against the technically driven calculative rationality that “uproots” the human being from the Earth. Thus, Heidegger relates, “For me, Hölderlin is the poet who points into the future, who waits for a god, and who, consequently, should not remain merely an object of research according to the canons of literary history.” It is from Hölderlin’s return to the origin of Western humanity’s poetic and conceptual ground that Heidegger conceives of the possibility of a “conversion” (Umkehr) to be prepared “only in the same place where the modern technical world took its origin.”

Reading Hölderlin reading Sophocles is how Heidegger sees that Umkehr in its potentiality for being (Seinkönnen) qua potentiality. Hence does Heidegger reflect upon Hölderlin’s “In lovely blue…” with anticipatory attention to the words that hold out that potentiality: “Full of merit, yet poetically, man dwells on this earth.” There is merit to man’s erecting of edifices, to his building of settlements, to his cultivating of the land, to his husbandry of animals, and so on. Yet, in the age of technology Heidegger clarifies, “Merits due to this building, however, can never fill out the nature of dwelling.” That is what Hölderlin would have us understand. For all his building guided by the intensified productive power of mass-scale technology, the human being who is unhomely but desires to become homely, to dwell, must let the earth be as earth, let the human be as mortal being, and let beings, in general, be what and how they are independent of modernity’s manipulative subjectivity. Calculative rationality and its modern technicity seek mastery rather than encourage a comportment of releasement (Gelassenheit). Yet, it is the latter that is necessary to the task of thinking in our destitute time. Absent this practice of releasement, we remain subject to the mastery of fate, to the law of temporality, as Alabanda said to Hyperion: “But all the works of men have in the end their punishment, and it’s only gods and children whom Nemesis doesn’t strike.”

101. Werner Marx, Is There a Measure on Earth?, takes up from Hölderlin the challenge in thought that is needed in our destitute time and thinks Heidegger’s thought further (weitergedacht) in view of a possible ethics, thus opening up a path to another thinking.
102. Hölderlin, Hyperion, or the Hermit in Greece, 120.
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