"Jean-François Lyotard, Evil, and the Turn to 'Para/Ethics'"[i]

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By evil, I understand, and one can only understand, the incessant interdiction of possible phrases, a defiance of the occurrence, the contempt for Being.
                    --Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend*

Certainty is the region of death, uncertainty the valley of life.
                    --Edmond Jabès, *The Book of Questions*

W(h)ither Postmodernism?

You are informed that human beings endowed with language [*doués de langage*] were placed in a situation such that none of them is now able to tell about it. Most of them disappeared then, and the survivors rarely speak about it. When they do speak about it, their testimony bears upon a minute part of this situation [*Quand ils en parlent, leur témoignage ne porte que sur une infime partie de cette situation*]. How can you know that the situation itself existed? That it is not the fruit of your informant's imagination? Either the situation did not exist as such. Or else it did exist, in which case your informant's testimony is false, either because he or she should have disappeared, or else because he or she should remain silent, or else because, if he or she does speak, he or she can bear witness only to the particular experience he had, it remaining to be established whether this was a component of the situation in question.

"I have analyzed thousands of documents. I have tirelessly pursued specialists and historians with my questions. I have tried in vain to find a single former deportee capable of proving to me that he had really seen, with his own eyes, a gas chamber" (Faurisson in Pierre-Naquet, 1981:81). To have "really seen with his own eyes" a gas chamber would be the condition which gives one the authority to say that it exists and to persuade the unbeliever. Yet it is still necessary to prove that the gas chamber was used to kill at the time it was seen. The only acceptable proof that is was used to kill is that one died from it. But if one is dead, one cannot testify that it is on account of the gas chamber--The plaintiff complains that he has been fooled about the existence of gas chambers, fooled that is, about the so-called Final Solution. His argument is: in order for a place to be identified as a gas chamber, the only eyewitness I will accept would be a victim of this gas chamber; now, according to my opponent, there is no victim that is not dead; otherwise, this gas chamber would not be what he or she claims it to be. There is, therefore, no gas chamber [*il n'y a donc pas de chambre à gaz*].
                    --Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend*

In the decades that saw the rise of postmodern studies—1980s and 90s—a discussion of "evil" was more or less "traditionally" placed into the philosophical sub-disciplines of epistemology, metaphysics, and, most obviously, ethics. By placing "traditionally," I mean to suggest that in this historical context engagements with "evil" presumed that inquiries into the topic would yield some practical, prescribed, or actionable result.

Postmodernism, with its anti-foundationalist impulses, seemed contrary to this goal and questions such as, How do postmodernists intend to rid the world of "evil"? Does epistemological "uncertainty" lead to ethical undecideablility? Does metaphysical "uncertainty" spiral into moral solipsism, ethical vacuity? formed the basis for rejecting postmodernism's relevance to the topic. I should further add that many viewed postmodernism, at the time, as a new and unfortunate form of skepticism and, with its refusal to accept any realist or deterministic totalizing approach to issues in general, many assumed postmodernists to be advocates of placing "evil" in the vast undifferentiated space of relativistic, amoral philosophy. In other words, postmodernism, if not "theory" itself, which was synonymous with postmodernism, ran counter to ethical reflection and would do absolutely nothing to curtail "evil" in the world, which, to be honest, was only partly true. While it is true that postmodernists did not have a plan to combat "evil," it would be false to say that postmodernists were not at the time concerned with the "problem of evil"; that is, the epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical "problem" that evil posed.

To be more historically precise, the anti-Semitic war time writings (the existence of which was announced on the front page of the *New York Times* in 1987) of the deconstructionist critic Paul de Man made the non-academic and academic communities enormously suspicious of these "new postmodern" philosophies coming from Paris and New Haven. And, in the case of the latter, there arose an even more dismissive attitude of postmodernism's ability to deal effectively with "moral issues." This history has been a major obstacle for "theory," generally, and postmodernism, specifically—overcoming the designation of "relativistic, ethically quiet French irrationalism." Even today, Slavoj Žižek, ironically the world's most famous theorist, regularly casts postmodern theory as a philosophy of relativistic multiplicity—a pastiche of variable, relativistic [(un)]certainties. The problem with this characterization, however, is that while postmodernist approaches in some corners were driven by a desire for a vapid pluralism, postmodernism, Lyotardian postmodernism to be precise, situated "evil" as the "problem of evil" differently and with quite different concerns. It is for this reason that a discussion of postmodernism and the problem of evil take a detour around this historical impasse—in short, one could say today, "that" wasn't the postmodernism that we were talking about. The first epigraph from Lyotard, in which he defined evil as "the incessant interdiction of possible phrases, a defiance of the occurrence, the contempt for Being," sounds very much contrary to the caricatured postmodern definition of evil as that which, like everything else, "is all relative." In *The Differend*, for instance, Lyotard is seriously concerned with the problem of "incessant interdiction" as a "problem of evil." In fact, "doing wrong to a phrase," as opposed to doing wrong to a person, is the basis of injustice and, subsequently, evil. From a casual reader's perspective, however, this emphasis on "phrasing" as an ethical theory may seem lacking, which would be correct if ethical theory necessitated a specific, concrete action. The "problem" of evil, from a Lyotardian point of view, is first a problem of phrasing; that is, linking phrases onto events is, with the intention of closing off all other future linkages, is unjust, if not evil. This is an important element in Lyotard's thinking, and one would be correct to see this in the context of metaphysics as well as ethics.[ii] Phrases, language produce reality-effects and it is important ask, What reality-effects is one creating with one's phrasings? Or, with one's interdiction of phrases?

Postmodernism attempts to dissolve a traditional definition of "evil" and then readdress it as a "problem of evil" is critical to understanding Lyotard's "gaming" of the problem of evil. It is this "transcendental move," a critique of the linguistic conditions for the concept, that caused many in the past to think that postmodernism and postmodernists were non-responsive, at best, to the issue of evil. As Adorno states in *Metaphysik*, "metaphysics would have to be defined as the effort of thinking to rescue what, at the same time, it dissolves."[iii] Comparing Lyotard to Adorno, then, would allow us to substitute "ethics" for "metaphysics," in this instance. The "problem of evil," rather than "evil," would be an ethical (re)thinking that tries to save

ethics from the dissolution of ethics. In other words, the "problem of evil," which is the incessant interdiction of phrases, cannot be addressed by the interdiction of more phrases. Saving ethical thinking means, in Lyotardian terms, saving the possibility of phrasing or bearing witness to the fact that there are phrasings that have yet to be phrased—resisting evil is, then, resisting the closure of phrasing or the closure of thinking. While "evil" may describe actions in the world, the problem of evil describes an ontology of injustice that is concerned with closing off the possibility of phrasing. The two, however, are not equivalent, and Lyotard never drew a moral line connecting the killing of people to the "killing" of phrasings, although the latter is the antecedent condition of the former.

II. Faurisson's Outrageous Challenge and the Work of Memory

Robert Faurisson, the French academic and Holocaust denier who was tried, convicted, and fined in 1983 for his revisionist account of Hitler's role in the death camps made a disturbing, perhaps perverse, legalistic challenge to the facticity of the Shoah by calling forth a "live" witness to testify to the deadly effects of Zyklon B. It is, as we sadly know, impossible to bring forward such a witness to testify for himself or herself or on <u>behalf</u> of those who had died in the gas-chamber—Zyklon B represents the ultimate closure of "eye witness phrasing." It is through this hyperbolic, juridical moment of absence that Faurisson attempts to arrive at what he considers to be the unquestionable historical truth: the non-existence of the gas-chamber. By invoking the power of representation and memory, in the form of an absent witness, to reveal the "truth" of the gas-chamber, Faurisson offers to us as a fact or the "logical conclusion" that the Shoah never occurred as a historical event. While the "active interior" of the gas-chamber may not be presentable as a narratological situation,[iv] it does not necessarily mean that it did not exist or, as we shall see, that its "existence" cannot be limited to experience of an "eye witness." For Faurisson, however, if just one living witness to the gas-chamber were to step forward from history and recall the chamber's interior, its death, then sufficient proof would be in that moment of recollection. This is where I would like to begin a discussion of evil and the differend.

Faurisson's denial of the gas chamber is, oddly, both an affirmation and a renunciation of memory's depth and, perhaps, its rootedness in the sacred, in the sense that memory is thought to be complete, epistemologically sound, incorrigible, validated by the continuity of the sacred, and the measure of truth—one "swears to God" to witness truthfully, at least in the American system. It can be argued, at the same time, however, that memory can attest to the abyss, the lapses in narrative, the pervasive forgetfulness of history; that is to say, memory, ironically, can bear "witness" to forgetting. It is this duality that brings to the surface a significant contrast between remembering and not forgetting.

Memory, I argue, after the Shoah, has become the "problem of memory." One of the many troubling questions that arises after the Shoah is one concerning the understanding of memory's long-held juridical connection to truth and the sacred. This is perhaps why the initial Holocaust memorials were not fixed or permanent to a landscape as they are today. Instead, they were narratives, The Yizkor Bikher, for instance. James E. Young, in his book *Holocaust Memorials and Meaning: The Texture of Memory*, likens these "books" to "symbolic tombstones" for those who died and did not leave "corpses to inter."[v] Young continues his analysis of the Yizkor Bikher by way of the interior site of the memorial over and against the memorial as an exterior site. Before the memorials occupied a landscape, they were sanctioned by and occupied an interior landscape of the mind, and it is here that one can asked, What is memory? What is forgetting? What is recollection? Are they not phrasings? Linkages? What does it mean to remember and forget? Answers to

these questions concerning juridical memory begin, some would argue, with the Greeks and their mythology. After all, was it not Tiresias who did <u>not</u> forget his own murder?

> Œdipus: "What tales? I must hear them all?
> Chorus: "How he met his death through traveling vagabonds
> Œdipus: "I've heard that too. We have no witnesses, however."[vi]

The preservation of memory finds its form in and as history through Herodatus. History, in the Greek sense, was not forgetting (not dying) what had taken place. In Plato's *Republic* the Myth of Er speaks to this deep connection between death and forgetfulness. It is Er who experiences death without suffering the casualty of memory:

After all the souls had chosen their lives, they went forward to Lachesis in the same order in which they had made their choices, and she assigned to each the daimon it had chosen as guardian of its life and fulfiller of its choice. This daimon first led the soul under the hand of Clotho as it turned the revolving spindle to confirm the fate that the lottery and its own choice had given it. After receiving her touch, he led the soul to the spinning Atropos, to make what had been spun irreversible. Then, without turning around, they went from under the throne of Necessity and, when all of them had passed through, they travelled to the plain of Forgetfulness in burning and choking, terrible heat, for it was empty of trees and earthly vegetation. And there, beside the River of Unheeding, whose water no vessel can hold, they camped, for night was coming on. All of them had to drink a certain measure of this water, but those who weren't saved by reason drank more than that, and as each of them drank, he forgot everything and went to sleep. But around midnight there was a clap of thunder and an earthquake, and they were suddenly carried away from there, this way and that, up to their births, like shooting stars. Er himself was forbidden to drink from the water. All the same, he didn't know how he had come back to his body, except that waking suddenly he saw himself lying on the pyre at dawn.

And so, Glaucon, his story wasn't lost but preserved, and it would save us, if we were persuaded by it, for we would then make a good crossing of the River of Forgetfulness, and our souls wouldn't be defiled. But if we are persuaded by me, we'll believe that the soul is immortal and able to endure every evil and every good, and we'll always hold to the upward path, practicing justice with reason every way. [vii]

Although one may find juridical memory to be uniquely Greek, it is the Jews who forge an idea of memory as history through a conversion of memory into remembrance, *Zakhor*.[viii] In other words, Jewish history is not predicated on the <u>not forgetting</u>, but on the inclusion of God in the events of the world. History, then, is God remembered, theophany. It is this tension between the Greek accessible memory and Jewish inaccessible memory which will shape our discussion of the sacred and memory.

Mircea Eliade's *Myth and Reality* provides us with a beginning through this tension and labyrinth of memory by taking up the history of memory in terms of Greek mythology. For Eliade, memory (*mnemne*) and forgetfulness (*amnesia*) are aspects of mythology insofar as one is the dialectical inversion of the other within the deep structures of human experience. Here, there are two primary sites, one of primordial memory and the other of individual memory. In this understanding, memory is separated from the profane. The truth, knowledge, for the Greeks, was a process of remembering that which the soul already knew:

For only the soul that has beheld truth may enter into our human form, passing from a plurality of perceptions to a unity gathered together by reasoning—and such understanding is the recollection of those things which our soul beheld aforetime as they journeyed with their god, looking down upon the things which now we suppose to be, and gazing up to that which truly is. [ix]

Recollection (*anamnesis*), however, is that which interrupts the smoothness of the dialectic, and the depth of the structure in that the soul does not recollect the totality of memory: "Memory, Plotinus held, is for those who have forgotten. For those who have forgotten, remembering is a virtue; but the perfect never lose the vision of truth and they have no need to remember." [x] Here is where one finds the difference between recollection (*anamnesis*) and memory (*mnemne*). Memory is complete and of the soul, while recollection is partial and fragmentary. Faurisson's point, if one understands him correctly, is that those who actually died in the gas chamber are the only ones who can speak to the truth of its existence. Faurisson links memory with existence in a peculiar way when he makes a thing's existence contingent upon memory or a memory. This brings us to the relationship between knowledge and memory. Of course, for the ancient Greeks, knowledge was memory. That is to say, what one knows is an effect of the soul's memory. This is particularly true of the relationship between knowledge and memory developed in the *Meno* and *Phaedrus*.

Faurrison's understanding of memory has a depth that is not altogether apparent if one does not see knowledge as a consequence of memory. The surface of memory, however, suggests a lack of depth, an absence of an original reality. In this sense, memory does not have the connotations of another world or original reality, which is somehow brought forth through remembering. One who remembers completely is a traveler between these two worlds, between life and death. Such a vision of the one who remembers, one who bears witness to an event, eclipses the surface of memory: "The fountain Lethe, forgetfulness, is a necessary part of the realm of death. The dead are those who have lost their memories." [xi] Those who cannot bear witness to the gas chamber, to return to Faurisson, have lost their memories to death. Like the waters from the fountain Lethe, Zyklon B erased memories. Therefore, there is no memory of the gas chamber, there is, in its place, death. Faurisson's call to "witness" is a call to bear witness to death, to call forth memories which have been eradicated by and in death. In this regard, Faurisson is calling out for Tiresias, Amphiaraus, or Aethalides who have unchangeable memories in an eternal existence.

Since we do not have a Tiresias, Amphiaraus, or Aethalides to bear witness to the event(s) of the Nazi gas-chamber or death itself, we only can be concerned about the gas chamber. That is to say, we can only (not) talk about the gas chamber, not of it. It is here that parasacarality conjoins with ethics to form a "para/ethics," an ethics about ethics or ethics beside and around itself. Ethics suffers from the same dialectical thinking which effects politics. Events are suspended between two oppositional points that are drawn together through a defined process of reconciliation of polarities. These two oppositional points are, actually, thought of as two interdependent realms, the real and the actual. Ethics is then traditionally presented as a way of tying together the two realms (opposing ends of the same string) or resolving the tension or distance between the two. What were to happen, conceptually, if the string were cut into an infinity of segments? What is/was the continuity keeping the string one single, uninterrupted line holding the two points in opposition? History? Sacrality? God? Eternality? All of these could produce continuity depending of the narrative deployed with the bipartition of the world. It is the nature of narrative to tie together points. In this sense, anything could initiate a narrative that would explain any event. The move, however, is not to find the grandest of narratives, but to recognize, at least, two important points: anything (history, god, class, race, gender, sexuality, etc.) can produce a grand narrative which can account, with equal proficiency, for the continuity of all events; nothing can account for discontinuity given that accounting for is an invocation of

continuity—the continuity of discontinuity, if you will. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari begin their book *What is Philosophy?* with the discontinuity of the concept:

There are no simple concepts. Every concept has components and is defined by them. It therefore has a combination [*chiffre*]. It is a multiplicity, although not every multiplicity is conceptual. There is no concept with only one component. Even the first concept, the one with which a philosophy "begins," has several components, because it is not obvious that philosophy must have a beginning, and if it does determine one, it must combine it with a point of view or a ground [*une raison*]. Not only do Descartes, Hegel, and Feuerbach not begin with the same concept, they do not have the same concept of beginning. Every concept is at least double or triple, etc. Neither is there a concept possessing every component, since this would be chaos pure and simple. Even so-called universals as concepts must escape the chaos by circumscribing a universe that explains them (contemplation, reflection, communication). Every concept has an irregular contour defined by the sum of its components, which is why, from Plato to Bergson, we find the idea of the concept being a matter of articulation, of cutting and cross-cutting. The concept is a whole because it totalizes its components, but it is a fragmentary whole. Only on this condition can it escape the mental chaos constantly threatening it, stalking it, trying to reabsorb it.[xii]

The prefix *para* indicates this complexity, this beyond, this extra, this alteration of the continuous line found in things such as subjectivity, ethics, politics, experience. It is not so much a continuous missing the mark as it is an erring or a wandering around the not: "The question of the not, therefore, is a question of the unthinkable that we can neither think nor not think. In thinking not, thought approaches a limit that inhabits it *as if* from within. This exteriority, which is interior, rends thought, leaving it forever incomplete."[xiii] This beyond, extra, disruption, or alteration is what Jean-François Lyotard identifies in "Discussion, or Phrasing 'After Auschwitz'" as speculative dialectics (dialectical logic). I attend to the trope of speculative dialectics through Deleuze's (non)concept of "singularity-event." Just as Deleuze comes to question the univocity (totalization) of actualization (the concretization of knowledge within language games), Lyotard, too, working out of Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*, comes to question the shaping rules which govern the linking of phrases within discursive structures or language-compounds. The linkages surrounding the death camp that set into motion Lyotard's phrasing after Auschwitz point to another issue that I will subsequently take up as the beyond, extra, or alteration of speculative dialectics as it relates to politics, or the polis that <u>wills</u> its own end. This task culminates in an argument against a unilateral politics (the polis' willing of its own end) and an argument for a para or pagan (pagus) politics which will, unlike the prior construction that is based upon a monological or one-sided infrastructure (pure ethics), have a heterological or multiple and varied infrastructure (para-ethics) out of which occurs a respect for *differends* and for the multiplicity of justice.

III The Lyotardian and Deleuzean Driftwork of Ethics

One drifts, then, from the synthesizing effects of the monological infrastructure (Lyotard's Grand Narrative or speculative dialectics) and towards the Deleuzean supple segmentarity of lines or quantum flows which offer the possibility of another sense of time, another subjectivity, and another politics.[xiv] There is, I argue, a correspondence between Deleuze's and Lyotard's understanding of the epistemological question insofar as both philosophers' work take up and juxtapose the two "Kants." Kant, as Lyotard indicates, is both an epilogue to modernity and a prologue to postmodernity. Kant, sitting astride these two conceptual *regimens*, poses an interesting and equally troubling question of ethics and politics that focuses on the

incommensurability of the Idea of reason and the concept. Both Deleuze and Lyotard recognize the Kantian problem as a problem concerning linkages within and between categories (faculties) or *genres*. Central to the Kantian problem is the issue of first principles or grounding—the ground(ing) of the subject and the ground(ing) of the political. Each of these ground(ing)s, if you will, is a nodal point along a segmented line(s). The first point is the "autonomous" subject who "knows" the ethical a priori; and the second point is the polis that is the alleged culmination of humanity; the self'-presence of the polis (we) allows itself to <u>will</u> its own telos. A Deleuzean and related Lyotardian rewriting of this Kantian problematic entails an encounter with this culminating moment identified as Hegelian dialectics—or, that which synthesizes the phrases of Kant's *Begebenheit* or event into a fixed historico-reality. Of this Lyotard writes in his essay "The Sign of History" that

[t]he Begebenheit, which is a *datum in* experience at least, if not *of* experience, must be the index of the idea of Free causality. With this *Begebenheit* we must get as close as possible to the abyss to be crossed between mechanism on the one hand and liberty or finality on the other, between the domain of the sensory world and the field of the suprasensible—and we should be able to leap across it without suppressing it, by fixing the status of the historico-political—a status which may be inconsistent and indeterminate, but which can be spoken, and which is even irrefutable.[xv]
What is this leap if it is not the dialectic or the signifier in search of a signified?

Lyotard's writings on Auschwitz, "Discussions, or Phrasing 'after Auschwitz'," concerns itself with the same questioning of the dialectic or leap which also concerns Adorno in his text *Negative Dialectics* where he writes, "In the camps death has a novel horror; since Auschwitz, fearing death means fearing worse than death."[xvi] This essay discusses the epistemological gap between the Idea of reason and concept, and the speculative discourses which have, in modernity, synthesized the two; the chapter will first explore Deleuze's logic of sense or, more specifically, the (non)concepts of singularity and event and then Lyotard's *differend* in order to arrive at a discussion or phrases about the anonym Auschwitz. Another subjectivity, another politics, another ethics . . . , are perpetually bothered and hampered by the extant and rigid politics, ethics, subjectivity or Kant's nodal points and modernity's tendency to synthesize discourses through the Hegelian dialectic.

In prefacing his collections of musings entitled *Dialogues* Gilles Deleuze writes against a Kantian ground zero and a Hegelian totality: "Every multiplicity grows from the middle, like a blade of grass or the rhizome. We constantly oppose the rhizome to the tree, like two conceptions and even two very different ways of thinking. A line does not go from one point to another, but passes between the points, ceaselessly bifurcating and diverging, like one of Pollock's lines."[xvii] Achieving another politics, another ethics, another subjectivity, Deleuze argues, necessitates thinking "rhizomically." Contrary to the historico-reality constructed by and out of the unifying tendency and binary logic of modernity or Enlightenment thinking, a rhizomic reality lacks a ground zero or a moment of metaphysical certitude and determinacy by which all phrases (shoots) are linked. Deleuze advances this rhizomic thinking through the (non) concept of singularity—the multiplicity or heterogeneity of the universe of phrases. For Deleuze the universe of phrases is like a universe of lines; lines which do not share a point of departure nor do they share a point of arrival. Deleuze, in *Dialogues*, *The Logic of Sense*, and *A Thousand Plateaus*, is preoccupied with the notion of lines and cracks. In *Dialogues* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari discuss F. Scott Fitzgerald's short story "Crack-up" in which Fitzgerald describes his life as a collection of fractures represented by a multitude of lines. Fitzgerald, who is, in the text, looking back on a life of alcoholism and collapse, writes:

Of course all life is a process of breaking down, but the blows that do the dramatic side of the work—the big sudden blows that come or seem to come, from outside—the ones you remember and blame things on and, in moments of weakness, tell your friends about, don't show their effect all at once. There is another sort of blow that comes from within—that you don't feel until it's too late to do anything about it, until you realize with finality that in some regard you will never be as good a man again. The first sort of breakage seems to happen quick—the second kind happens almost without your knowing it but is realized suddenly indeed.[xviii]

It is, I think, this process of breaking down that Fitzgerald manages to capture which interests Deleuze the most. Later in "Crack-up" Fitzgerald uses the image of a cracked plate, with all its divergent lines, to depict the process of living. It is a plate that must be hidden from company, and, on the rare occasion that it is used, it rests underneath another plate holding leftovers in the refrigerator. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze continues his preoccupation with lines and cracks when he refers to Fitzgerald's alcoholism and turbulent relationship with Zelda[xix] as lines of flight:

Beautiful texts. All of the lines are there: the lines of family and friends, of those who speak, explain, and psychoanalyze, assigning rights and wrongs, of the whole binary machine of the Couple, united or divided, in rigid segmentarity (50 percent). Then there is the line of supple segmentation, from which the alcoholic and the madwoman extract, as from a kiss on the lips and eyes, the multiplication of a double at the limit of what they can endure in their state and with tacit understandings serving them as internal messages. Finally, there is a line of flight, all the more shared now that they are separated, or vice versa, each of them the clandestine of the other, a double all the more successful now that nothing has importance any longer, now that everything can begin anew, since they have been destroyed but not by each other. Nothing will enter memory, everything was on the lines, in the AND that made one *and* the other imperceptible, without disjunction or conjunction but only a line of flight forever in the process of being drawn, toward a new acceptance, the opposite of renunciation or resignation—a new happiness?[xx]

The line of flight (dis)connects the singularity of the universe of phrases to the relationship (event); this anti-Hegelian move is not accomplished by revealing the actual essence of Fitzgerald and Zelda's relationship, but by drawing or extending the line(s) out of and around the relationship as it relates to family and friends—the line of flight, consequently, is a multiple line(s). For Deleuze, the line of flight forever in the process of being drawn is the para of (para) ethics and (para) politics because it prohibits the collapse of the universe of phrases into a solid, undifferentiated, discursive mass. If one takes the relationship between Fitzgerald and Zelda to be an event, then Deleuze's fascination with it and the short story "Crack-up" becomes a telling moment in his assault on the synthesizing process of the dialectic. The on-going extension of the line(s) of flight speaks to what Wittgenstein would call the "state of affairs" insofar as the line(s) of flight don't concede to a totality or a determinate language game. Deleuze and Guattari find an added dimension to the relationship that complicates an all too glib explication of it in the discourses of psychology or marriage counseling, for example.

The "Fifteenth Series of Singularities" in *The Logic of Sense* addresses this issue of totalizing discourses or a determinate language game by setting up a distinction and relation between singularity and event. First, the singularities, Deleuze tells us, ". . . are the true transcendental events" [. . . *sont les vrais événements transcendantaux*][xxi] in that they escape a synthesizing moment or, in other words, never have their potential completely actualized within a discursive structure (Marxism, psychoanalysis, fascism). Singularities, as line(s) of flight, do not have a congealed ontos nor do they have a congealed telos. They have, as Lyotard would phrase it, two zero points much the same way a rhizomic understanding of language posits subterranean,

unrooted shoots as a metaphor for disunity and multiplicity of logic. Deleuze, early in the chapter, uses the example of a battle that ". . . *hovers over* its own field, being neutral in relation to all its temporal actualizations, neutral and impassive in relation to the victor and the vanquished, the coward and the brave."[xxii] The battle, seen as hovering above its own field, prohibits a complete or exhaustive actualization through a grounding or an anchoring of <u>intelligibility</u> within a cognitive genre (pure referentiality). Deleuze understands this suspension to be an "indifference" to the total(izable) actualization; it is, instead, an event which has an infinite number of singularities bringing it into partial and incomplete positioning within the universe of phrases:

In the first place, singular-events correspond to heterogeneous series which are organized into a system which is neither stable nor unstable, rather "metastable," endowed with a potential energy wherein the differences between series are distributed. (Potential energy is the energy of the pure event [*l' événement pur*], whereas forms of actualization correspond to the realization of the event) [*tandis que les formes d' actualisation correspondent aux effectuations de l' événement*]. In the second place, singularities posses a process of auto-unification, always mobile and displaced to the extent that a paradoxical element traverses the series and makes them resonate [*fait résonner*], enveloping the corresponding singular points in a single aleatory point and all emissions, all dice throws, in a single cast [*tous les coups, dans un même lancer*].[xxiii]

If one understands the throw of the dice to be an event, then the combinations on the face of the dice correspond to the singularities. Before the dice rest any combination is possible, and the possibility of the dice dropping off the table is a possibility as well. As an example of the heterogeneity of singularity within an event "dice work;" however, in a sense, it trivializes the conceptual space that Deleuze and Guattari have opened. A more philosophically troublesome example comes from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*: "If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games [*Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprachspiele*] in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: What is a question?—Is it the statement that I do not know such-and such, or the statement that I wish the other person would tell me. . .?— And is the cry "Help!" such a description?"[xxiv] Wittgenstein finishes his thought with a speculation about the possibilities of transformation and how the multiplicity of the language games or keeping them organized would, eventually, become clearer in another place. It is contested as to whether or not Wittgenstein ever did make it any clearer. He, as I understand his work, muddled it—and this muddling was to his credit. Just as the throw of the dice 'contain' all the possible combinations, so, too, does a Deleuzean event. Wittgenstein's hesitation over the possibilities of transformation corresponds to Deleuze's singularity-event insofar as the phrasing is enmeshed in the action without a direct and knowable cause and effect relation:

The problem is therefore one of knowing how the individual would be able to transcend his form and his syntactical link with a world, in order to attain to the universal communication of events [*l'universelle communication des événements*], that is, to the affirmation of a disjunctive synthesis beyond logical contradictions, and even beyond alogical incompatibilities. It would be necessary for the individual to grasp herself as event [*Il faudrait que l'individu se saisisse lui-même comme événement*]; and that she grasp the event actualized within her as another individual grafted [*greffé*] onto her. In this case, she would not understand, want, or represent this event without also understanding and wanting all other events as individuals, and without representing all other individuals as events. Each individual would be like a mirror for the condensation of singularities and each world a distance in the mirror [. . .*chaque monde une distance dans le miroir*].[xxv]

In the above passage, Deleuze unveils the problem of and in ethics and politics; both ethics and politics are united by and through the Enlightenment (self-present) subject. It is this autonomous individual who, as Kant (the prologue to postmodernity) tells us, is never fully autonomous. It is around the issue of the subject where Deleuze and Kant seem to run similar intellectual paths. Deleuze, however, is more bothered by the belatedness of intelligibility than is Kant in *The Critique of Pure Reason*:

Reason concerns itself exclusively with absolute totality in the employment of the concepts of the understanding, and endeavors to carry the synthetic unity, which is thought in the category, up to the completely unconditioned. We may call this unity of appearances the unity of reason, and that expressed by the category the unity of understanding. Reason accordingly occupies itself solely with the employment of understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the concept of the absolute totality of conditions is not applicable in any experience, since no experience is unconditioned), but solely in order to prescribe to the understanding its direction towards a certain unity of which it has itself no concept, and in such a manner as to unite all the acts of understanding, in respect to every object, into an absolute whole. I understand by idea a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience...If I speak of an idea, then as regards its object, viewed as an object of pure understanding, I am saying a great deal, but as regards its relation to the subject, that is, in respect of its actuality under empirical conditions, I am for the same reason saying very little, in that, as being the concept of a maximum, it can never be correspondingly given in concreto.[xxvi]

In not having an object in the concrete or an unalterable syntactical mooring in the world, the subject is left with what Lyotard calls in "Discussions, or Phrasing 'After Auschwitz'" a "paraexperience." It is the Kantian gap between the idea of reason and concept, or Deleuze's disjunctive synthesis, which makes a determinate experience impossible and, by implication, any cohesive cognition impossible as well. Through Kant and, later, Deleuze, a critical force in philosophy is made visible and that vision, unlike Boethius' vision of Lady Philosophy, to borrow a phrase, is incorrigible. The seeing subject, then, is a deconstructed subject living in the wake of post-referential indeterminacy. This de-centered subject is the cornerstone of poststructuralist thought and there is an overabundance of texts annotating the decentered subject's affect on literature, psychoanalysis, and culture studies. These rehearsals of the Kantian wound often move toward a quick suturing by way of some banal playfulness of language, or deconstruction as a reading technology. , Lyotard, like Gilles Deleuze, asks the difficult historico-political question about Auschwitz. From a complex poststructuralist or postreferential frame, a frame which I have tried to work in terms of Deleuze's (non) concepts of singularity and event, Lyotard rewrites this historico-political, or the modern moment without its actualization within the unified Enlightenment subject nor its objects in concreto. Instead, Lyotard writes the historico-political as a contest of phrases in and around a *differend*:[xxvii] "The differend is the unstable state or instant of language which ought to be able to be phrased cannot yet be phrased."[xxviii] It is this rewriting of Auschwitz through the concept of the *differend* which I understand to be what Deleuze means by a new type or post-referential revolution in the course of becoming possible.\

IV. The Ethics of the Differend

The *differend* is, I argue, an expression of Deleuze's singularity-event. The instability of language creates a moment of radical doubt within the language-games (genres) of ethics and politics. The referent, that object in the world, hovers above, like the Deleuzean battle, its own ground. This lack of grounding rends the historical fabric by which ethics and politics are arrived at and adjudicated. Perhaps the most crucial historical

event in the twentieth century is Auschwitz. It stands to signify a multitude of ethical and political agendas. For the revisionist historian Faurisson, Auschwitz is the historical event that never was. For others, it is the historical event that will always be. It is this sense of Auschwitz which Lyotard finds so compelling in Adorno. Lyotard, from his reading of Adorno, "Discussion, or Phrasing 'after Auschwitz,'" writes:

'Auschwitz' is a model, not an example. From Plato to Hegelian dialectics the example, says Adorno, has the function in philosophy of illustrating an idea; it does not enter into a necessary relation with what it illustrates, but remains 'indifferent' to it. The model, on the other hand, 'brings negative dialectics into the real.' As a model, 'Auschwitz' does not illustrate negative dialectics. Negative dialectics, because it is negative, blurs the figures of the concept (which proceed from affirmation), scrambles the names borne by the stages of the concept in its movement. This model responds to this reversal in the destiny of the dialectic; it is the name of something) of a para-experience, of a paraempiricity) wherein dialectics encounters a non-negatable negative, (*un negatif non niable*), and abides in the impossibility of redoubling that negative into a 'result.' Wherein the mind's wound is not scarred over. Wherein, writes Derrida, 'the investment in death cannot be integrally amortized.'

The "Auschwitz' model would designate an experience of language which brings speculative discourse to a halt.[xxix]

The name Auschwitz brings speculative discourse to a halt by first denying the Kantian nodal points—a subject who could bear witness[xxx] to the gas chamber and the culmination of humanity in an act of consensus about the status of the event— Secondly, the name Auschwitz interrupts the synthesis of an understanding, as Adorno indicates, when dialectics encounters a non-negatable negative. Lyotard continues Adorno's point of a non-negatable negative by stating that Auschwitz can no longer be named in the Hegelian sense of naming ". . . as that figure of memory", like the Deleuzean dice, " . . . which assures the permanence of the *rest* when mind has destroyed its signs."[xxxi] "Auschwitz" is a name for the anonymous. The collapse of the name in the Hegelian sense opens the anonym, "Auschwitz", to another ethics, politics, subjectivity, which I mentioned earlier as a new type of revolution or (pagan) (para) politics. The anonym 'Auschwitz' bars the litigation over a claim to realism within a cognitive regime. For Lyotard, litigation has ended with the arrival of the *differend*. Instead of competing claims to the real, one has the question, What is to be linked onto Auschwitz?

The question of linkage is the question of justice and, ultimately, the question of the heterogeneity of justice. Claims to the historico-real, such as Faurisson's, install an oppressive regime within the universe of phrases. Positivist historians, in a conflict with revisionist historians such as Faurisson, must find the witness he asks for. Both the positivist and revisionist historian are tied to realism or unmediated referentiality. In other words, the historians who claim the gas chamber existed are obligated, because of the cognitive regime, to justify the real experience of the gas chamber by producing a witness. Revisionist historians need only to ask for the empirical evidence, an eyewitness. Of course, a quick dismissive wave of the hand places Faurisson and those like him in the category of the insane, unethical or Nazi. But, the question of ethics still persists as a gap between the concept and the Idea of reason. In *The Differend*, Lyotard responds to the cognitive genre by pointing to the silences within it, the multiplicity which has been dialectized:

That is why the question 'Auschwitz'? is also the question 'after Auschwitz'? The unchaining of death [*Le déchaînement de l'obligation extrême, la mort*], the utmost obligation, from what legitimates it is perpetuated 'after' the crime; scepticism, and even nihilism, have every reason to feed off this endlessly. For it is not even

true, as Hegel believes, that afterward it still remains for us to chew and digest, in our lair, the 'nul and void' of the legitimate linkage [*de l'enchaînement légitimant*], the extermination of a determined we. The dispersive, merely negative and nearly analytical dialectics at work under the name of 'Auschwitz', deprived of its 'positive-rational operator', the *Resultat*, cannot engender anything, not even the sceptical we that chomps on the shit of the mind. The name would remain empty, retained along with other names in the network of a world, put into mecanographical or electronic memory. But it would be nobody's memory, about nothing and for no one [*Mais mémoire de personne, à propos de rien et pour personne*].[xxxii]

What does it mean for Auschwitz to be nobody's memory? Lyotard, I think, is assaulting Kant's (here the epilogue to modernity) first nodal point—the knowing subject. In this sense, it is nobody's memory because nobody is capable of synthesizing the singularities and the event. In other words, the gas chamber is reproducible. The same can be said of the memory being about nothing. To be something is to find an end within the dialectic. Lyotard reads Adorno, and I think he is correct, as saying that the end of the dialectic is that novel part of the death camps, that "worse than death."[xxxiii]

> (The sea of my memory is white. It will be blue if I want, with words joining in dreams and in the violence of waves swelled and beaten down by fever.
>
> Secret fauna and flora which the reverberations of the page had hidden, now, at the end of the day, I watch them evolve as one might dive with eyes open to explore deep waters.
>
> I go to meet my words and bring them back to the surface, unaware that I lead them to their death. But this is an illusion.
>
> The surface of the sea is a mirror one breaks in turning the page. All azure of my pen and my death which I importune.
>
> I have the algae for living companions.)
>
> --Edmond Jabés, *The Book of Questions*

Are we, then, left with nothing? The answer is yes, if by nothing one means a result[xxxiv] out of a dialectic; the answer is no, if by nothing one means the anonym Auschwitz as something which cannot be remembered nor be forgotten, a borderland. It is this tension between not remembering and not forgetting where Lyotard's "paganism" is useful and it is in *Just Gaming* where he develops it in relation to the ethical-political arena. In the dialogue, Lyotard's interlocutor, Jean-Loup Thebaud, asks, ". . . where does the specificity of paganism lie?"[xxxv] Lyotard answers, ". . . What makes paganism? It consists in the fact that each game[xxxvi] is played as such, which implies that it does not give itself as the game of all other games or the true one."[xxxvii] A (language) game that gives itself as the game of all over games is the game of ethics insofar as ethics posit an ontological truth. The same holds true for the (language) games of politics, Marxism, Freudianism, and feminism. The pagan ends totality by pressing for the invention of new ways of phrasing which can either be actual inventions or alterations of old phrasings. Much like Deleuze's sense of segmentarity, the pagan opens onto the multiplicity of languages with the recognition that *differends* exist and persist. One such *differend* occurs when 'Auschwitz' needs to be phrased and cannot yet be phrased. At first one looks to the linkages surrounding the phrasing of Auschwitz. Whose phrasing is it?   It is the experience of Auschwitz which now serves as the ontological moment of truth. Lyotard asks the following:

Why say that this anonym designates an 'experience of language', a 'para-experience'? Is that not to insult the millions of real dead in the real barracks and gas chambers of real concentration camps? It can be surmised what advantages a well-led indignation can derive from the word reality. And what is spawned by this indignation is the embryo of the justice-maker. It is this indignation, however, with its claim to realism, which insults the name of Auschwitz, for this indignation is itself the only result it derives from that collective murder. It does not even *doubt* that there is a result (namely itself). Now, if this name is a nameless name, if Auschwitz does not provide an example but a mode, it is perhaps because nothing, or at least not all, of what has been expended in it is conserved; because the requirement of a result is therein disappointed and driven to despair; because speculation does not succeed in deriving a profit from it, were it the minimal one of the beautiful soul. That all this is an affair of language is known only too well by asking the indignant ones: what then does 'Auschwitz' mean to say to you? For one must, in any case, *speak* (dire).[xxxviii]

Phrasing after Auschwitz has been a phrasing of the ethical-political from an example or descriptive model. It has urged us to see or glimpse the truth of the gas chamber when all we are actually able to glimpse is our own 'paraexperience.' Since we cannot breathe in the gas, we ought not to claim that we can and do. To do so, is to speak for those who cannot speak and this speaking in place of is an annihilation as well. Instead, we have a nameless Auschwitz, an anonym without a moment of translucent intelligibility to be linked onto another event. Auschwitz was and is in the borderland. It is in the borderland now because it works, as Derrida tells us in *Margins of Philosophy*, as a "breach" (felure) – a "unique event, nonreproducible, hence illegible as such and when it happens. . ."[xxxix] If Auschwitz is that breach in the ethical-political arena, then what will follow this rupture? This is what Lyotard takes up as an issue of phrasing "after Auschwitz." Not only is a notion of time, that linear progression of events, breached, the links between these "events" and the constructedness of events themselves are breached as well. A new type of revolution in the course of becoming possible is not a simple deferral of Auschwitz; it is a revolution that holds open the possibility for an end to oppression, breaching the integrity of the cognitive regime. To not speak for those who cannot speak is to bear witness to their annihilation.

To say, as Faurisson does, that, "There is, therefore, no gas chamber" is to forge a link between to phrases within an empirical reality. "There is" suggest an historical real or referential scheme which serves to measure and adjudicate all understandings. Faurisson, here, points to the real and, in his act of pointing, calls upon modernity to join "there is" to "there is no. . ."; "Therefore" is the phrase's hinge. With "therefore", Faurisson instantiates the ready made frame of empiricism. One, then, is forced to accept the link "no gas chamber." A (para) politics out of Deleuze and Lyotard would have us say, "There is, therefore, . . . a differend." The difficulty of a (para) politics is that it calls attention to its own (para) ethical structuration. In other words, unlike the empirical frame Faurisson invokes, a (para) ethical frame works against itself. It works against itself by acknowledging an 'outside' to itself. Outside the frame is the revolutionary point in that the (para) political frame forecloses on its claim to internal integrity and pure referentiality. The gas chamber, then, was not and is not an enclosed space; it opened and opens onto other points outside of itself that have and cannot yet be put into phrases. And because of this inability to phrase, as Adorno writes, the death camps take on a "novel horror"--an illegibility, a problem of silence, a problem of evil.

Notes

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[i] This essay is a revised version of a chapter entitled "Para-Shoah" from *Para/Inquiry: Postmodern Religion and Culture*, London/New York: Routledge, 2000.

ii Rodolphe Gasché, "Saving the Honor of Thinking: On Jean-François Lyotard," *Parallax*, 2000, vol.6. no.4, 127-145.

iii Ibid, 132.

iv In the foreword to Jean-François Lyotard's *Heidegger and the "jews,"* David Carroll explains the difficulty the survivors' memory has in (re)telling the events of the Holocaust. He points to Shoah as an example of memory which easily can take multiple political, moral, and military paths. The difficulty, as Carroll reading Lyotard suggests, is in understanding the Holocaust as a foundation for political or ethical action:

> The literature of the concentration camps indicates that most survivors of the Shoah, who are hostage to the impossible obligation and task of talking/not talking about "that," are more modest than this. They know that if it is impossible to tell of what happened, this is why they must tell and retell what happened. This gives them no privilege; on the contrary they find themselves in an impossible narratological, political, and moral situation each time they begin to talk about "that." If they do not know what to tell or how to tell, they do know that it will do no "good" to tell, that what will be ignored or misunderstood, perhaps even used for dogmatic political, religious, and moral purposes that most often probably make it seem as if it would have been better not to have told at all. But because they have to tell, they do, but never easily and most often with a feeling that they have betrayed something or someone by doing so, that their telling has betrayed what it has told and those who cannot tell (Jean-François Lyotard, *Heidegger and the "jews,"* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990, ix-x.

v James E. Young, *Holocaust Memorials and Meaning: The Textual of Memory*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993, 7.

vi Sophocles, *Œdipus the King*, New York: Harper Row, 1960, 34.

vii Plato, *Plato's Republic*, trans. G.M.E. Grube, New York: Hackett Publishing, 1992, ll. 620e-621d.

viii Cf. Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Yosef, *Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory*, Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1982, 5.

ix Plato, *The Phaedrus*, Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1980, ll. 249c

x Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality,* New York: Meridian Books, 1970, 119.

xi Eliade, 121.

xii Gilles Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, 15-16.

xiii Mark C. Taylor, *Nots,* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993, 1.

xiv In *Dialogues*, Deleuze writes his way to a more accessible articulation of singularity through the example of lines. He states that,

> Whether we are individuals or groups, we are made up of lines and these lines are very varied in nature. The first kind of line which forms us is segmentary--of rigid segmentarity (or rather there are many lines of this sort): family-profession; job-holiday; holiday-family-and then school-and then the army-and then the factory-and then retirement. And each time, from one segment to the next, they speak to us saying: 'Now you're not a baby any more'; and at school, 'You're not at home now'; and in the army, 'You're not at school now'. . . In short, all kinds of clearly defined segments, in all kinds of directions, which cuts us up in all senses, packets of segmentarized lines. At the same time, we have lines of segmentarity which are more supple, as it were molecular. It's not that they are more intimate or personal--they run through societies and groups as much as individuals. They trace out little modifications, they make detours, they sketch out rises and falls: but they are no less precise for all this, they even direct irreversible processes. But rather than molar lines with segments, they are molecular fluxes with thresholds and quanta. A threshold is crossed, which does not necessarily coincide with a segment of more visible lines (*Dialogues* 124).

These second lines are the linchpin for Deleuzean "politics" in that these second lines open onto other possibilities or becomings. In other words, the fluidity of the second lines "compensate" the rigidity of the first lines by continually positing the phrase, ". . . it could be otherwise."

xv Jean François Lyotard, "The Sign of History," *The Lyotard Reader*, trans. G. Bennington, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, 400.

xvi Lyotard, 363.

xvii Gilles Deleuze, *Dialogues,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, viii.

xviii F. Scott Fitzgerald, "Crack-up" in *The Fitzgerald Reader.* Arthur Mizener, ed. New York: Scribners, 1963, 405.

xix In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari cite Fitzgerald's description of his relationship with Zelda:

> Perhaps fifty percent of our friends and relations will tell you in good faith that it was my drinking that drove Zelda mad, and the other half would assure you that it was her madness that drove me to drink. Neither of these judgments means much of anything. These two groups of friends and relations would be unanimous in saying that each of us would have been much better off without the other. The irony is that we have never been more in love with each other in all our lives. She loves the alcohol on my lips. I cherish her most extravagant hallucinations. . . . In the end, nothing really had much importance. We destroyed ourselves. But in all honesty, I never thought we destroyed each other (206).

xx Deleuze and Guattari, 206-7.

xxi Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, 102.

xxii Deleuze, 100.

xxiii Deleuze, 104.

[xxiv]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* in *Deconstruction in Context*, Mark C. Taylor, ed., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986, 228.

[xxv]Deleuze, 178.

[xxvi]Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959, 383-384.

[xxvii] In *The Differend* Lyotard states the following:

> The differend is the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be. This state includes silence which is a negative phrase, but it also calls upon phrases which are in principle possible. This state is signaled by what one ordinarily calls a feeling: "One cannot find the words," etc. A lot of searching must be done to find new rules for forming and linking phrases that are able to express the differend disclosed by the feeling, unless one wants this differend to be smothered right away in a litigation and for the alarm sounded by the feeling to have been useless. What is at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, in a politics perhaps, is to bear witness to differends by finding idioms for them.
>
> In the differend, something "asks" to be put into phrases, and suffers from the wrong of not being able to be put into phrases right away. This is when the human beings who thought they could use language as an instrument of communication learn through the feeling of pain which accompanies silence (and of pleasure which accompanies the invention of a new idiom), that they are summoned by language, not to augment to their profit the quantity of information communicable through existing idioms, but to recognize that what remains to be phrased exceeds what they can presently phrase, and that they must be allowed to institute idioms which do not yet exist (13).

[xxviii]Lyotard, Jean-François, *The Differend*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988, 22.

[xxix] Lyotard, *The Lyotard Reader*, 363-4.

[xxx] The concept of witness is a complicated one for anyone reading Lyotard. In *The Differend,* he uses the word "witness" to call attention to impossibility of such a person. In *The Postmodern Condition*, on the other hand, Lyotard calls upon the reader to bear witness to the differend and mulitiplicity.

[xxxi] Lyotard, *The Lyotard Reader*, 364.

[xxxii]Lyotard, *The Differend*, 101.

[xxxiii]Lyotard, *The Lyotard Reader*, 363.

[xxxiv] In "Result" Lyotard discusses the result as the end of the Hegelian dialectic. He qoutes Adorno in order to set the rules for linking:

> A chain of phrases comes to be linked together on the basis of this rule. Here are some of its links: 'It lies in the definition of the negative dialectic that it will not come to rest in itself, as if it were total. This is a form of hope" (*The Differend*, 152).

Lyotard's discussion in *The Differend* often turns to the Hegelian dialectic in order to further complicate the event of Auschwitz. To invest in the dialectic, is to end Auschwitz and it is this moment of closure on which Lyotard wages war.

[xxxv]Jean François Lyotard, *Just Gaming*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985, 60.

[xxxvi] I am acutely aware of dangers or possible connotations "game" has here. I think Lyotard has to be given some room in the sense that "game" has been a word used to describe the actions of language around a set of rules (i.e. Wittgenstein).

[xxxvii]Lyotard, *Just Gaming*, 60.

[xxxviii]Lyotard, *The Lyotard Reader*, 362.

[xxxix]Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981, xvii.