Scattering the Articles of Textual Law: An interrogation of the poethical turn in the later work of Levinas

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Abstract

This article interrogates the poethical turn in the work of the later Levinas. In the first instance, this reading brings to the fore the extent to which Levinas’ early ethical position paradoxically repeats formerly denigrated aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy. Secondly, through the aperture of Celan’s poetry, Levinas’ later ethical reformulation is examined. This article demonstrates that it is through a heightened attention to language that Levinas attempts to counter the tacit duplication of Heideggerian ideals. Crucially, this article seeks to establish that it is only when Levinas fully embraces the ‘poetry of language’ that the residual Heideggerian re-inscription is finally redressed; this process of redress being mediated via what Celan refers to as ‘the not-to-be-deciphered’ free-floating poetic word.

In 1972, Levinas published an essay interrogating the work of the Romanian-born German language poet Paul Celan; an essay first published in Revue des Belles-Lettres and later reproduced in Proper Names (1976). Therein, Levinas tentatively accords the work of Celan an ethical dimension allied to his own ethical thought. As he states, for Celan the poem is ‘situated precisely at that pre-syntactic and [...] pre-logical level’ – a level which is ‘pre-disclosing: at a moment of pure touching, pure contact, grasping, squeezing – which is, perhaps, a way of giving, right up to and including the hand that gives.’ A little later, and with direct reference to his own later ethical formulations, Levinas suggests that for Celan, the poem itself functions ‘as an unheard-of modality of the otherwise than being.’ Distancing himself from Heideggerian poetics, Levinas adds that the poem in Celan’s hands can be read as an act of giving that signifies ‘signification’ at level ‘older than ontology and the thought of being.’

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The shadow of Heidegger hangs heavy over both Levinas and Celan. As depicted in his poem ‘Todtnauberg’, Celan met Heidegger in July 1967, one imagines to confront the aging philosopher with regards to his brief and yet publically un-recanted Nazi past:

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Auf eines Denkenden
(ungesäumt kommendes)
Wort
im Herzen
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[hope today,
for a thinker’s
(un-
delaying coming)
word
in the heart]

As Celan’s friend, the poet Jean Daive (re-)remembers it in his poetic memoir, the meeting seems to have afforded little in terms of recompense:

He [Celan] smiles. He goes on:

– I had illusions. I hoped to be able to convince Heidegger. I wanted him to talk to me. I wanted to forgive. I waited for this: that he would find words to trigger my clemency. But he maintained his position.

Celan lost his parents and homeland in the Nazi horror. For Levinas, whose father and brothers were killed in Lithuania by the SS, the egology of Heidegger served to re-inscribe a Platonic sense of epistemic ‘lucidity’ with disastrous ethical implications. In short, the ‘light of Being’ failed to elude what Derrida was to term the ‘Greek domination of the Same and the One’. As such, the modality of Heideggerian Being became, within Levinas’ terms, complicit with a negation of Otherness. Hence it is that Levinas defines his philosophical project as an attempt to leave, or depart from, the climate of Heidegger’s thought – a departure that does not pay surreptitious homage to the principles of pre-Heideggerian ideals. As I will argue in this paper, in spite of this self-proclamation, the broad trajectory of Levinas’ early work is not overtly distinct from that of Heidegger. As I will demonstrate, it is only when Levinas fully embraces
the ‘poetry of language’ that the residual Heideggerian re-inscription is finally redressed; this process of redress being mediated via what Celan refers to as ‘the not-to-be-deciphered [das nicht zu enträtselnde]’ floating word, a poetic inscription free from the ‘light-wedges [lichtkeile]’ of epistemic closure, which, nonetheless, speaks ‘in the cause of a wholly Other [eines ganz Anderen].’

In order to pursue the aforesaid re-inscription, let us turn to an article Derrida published in 1964, an article entitled, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’. It is claimed therein that by ‘making the origin of language, meaning, and difference the relation to the infinitely other, Levinas is resigned to betraying his own intentions in his philosophical discourse’ (WD, 151).

How exactly does this self-betrayal occur? We should remember that Levinas’ ethical foundation is not a foundation. As Richard A. Cohen has put it: ‘Ethics does not have an essence, its “essence,” so to speak, is precisely not to have an essence, to unsettle essences.’ I would argue that Cohen’s colloquialism, ‘so to speak,’ is telling in the above context. As with the critical analyst, Levinas has to in some way articulate or make textually palpable that which precedes the march of the word or logos — he has to speak, he has to write or communicate his ideas. In Cohen’s commentary, this process of articulation takes the form of a rhetorical double negative that serves to elucidate Levinas’ ethic. Upon further analysis, surely any posited foundation, albeit one set in negation, merely partakes in the effaced binary discourse of foundationalism? A negative foundation is founded in the ‘trace’ of its effaced counterpart. Arguably, the so-called betrayal of intent thus occurs at the binary level of the text.

In slightly different terms, Levinas gestures towards that which is beyond, or apart from, the play of the text. Yet as Derrida is quick to point out, such a gesture calls us towards that which is impossible — it calls us towards an unutterable locus ‘beyond (tradition’s) Being and Logos’ (WD, 114). According to Derrida, it is not ‘possible either to think or state this call’ (WD, 114). In addition, Derrida claims that ‘the positive plenitude of classical infinity is translated into language only by betraying itself in a negative word (in-finite)’ (WD, 114). Herein, the thesis inhabits the anti-thesis at the level of binary signification. The negative essence, or in-finitely Other beyond the play of the word or logos, is equally grounded through what amounts to a process of antithetic articulation. As Heidegger before him, Levinas thus falls foul of the Greek lexicon of intelligibility. In short, the infinity of the beyond is assimilated within.

At another level, Levinas seeks to elucidate his thought by way of
metaphors pertaining to the Platonic light or Sun. Given his opposition to Platonic stasis, Levinas’ appeal seems, to say the least, somewhat paradoxical. Nevertheless, Levinas maintains that the idea of infinity is revealed via the ‘light of the face’ (TI, 151); consequently, we thus ‘encounter, in our own way, the Platonic idea of the Good beyond Being’ (TI, 293). Of course, the qualifying phrase – ‘in our own way’ – is hesitant. Taken at face value, Levinas would seem to be suggesting that the Other and the Platonic Good or Sun transcend Being in an analogous fashion. Yet surely, the Platonic Sun is the transcendental signified par excellence? Nevertheless, elsewhere Levinas suggests that the ‘Platonic conception of the intelligible sun situated outside of the eye that sees and the object it illuminates describes with precision the perception of things. Objects have no light of their own; they receive a borrowed light’ (TI, 74). This analogy might be reconfigured thus: to be able to comprehend or ‘see’ an object that is apart from the self, and moreover, to be able to comprehend oneself by way of apperception, one (as an individuated subject) must receive a ‘borrowed light.’ Such a light is the ‘light of epiphany’ emanating from the infinitely Other. In other words, to see presupposes that which is ‘outside of the eye’ or ‘I’. That which resides outside is the Other, an-Other situated, as the Platonic Sun, in the infinitely beyond. To summarize, an ulterior light is ‘needed to see the light’ (TI, 192).

If this chain of reasoning appears to be governed by a puzzling Platonic bias, elsewhere Levinas appeals to an antithetic light. As Derrida points out, Levinas sometimes maintains that the ‘nudity of the face of the other’ is an ‘epiphany of a certain non-light before which all violence is to be quieted and disarmed’ (WD, 85). Indeed, in later sections of Totality and Infinity, Levinas repudiates the light metaphor in no uncertain terms: ‘The shimmer of infinity, the face, can no longer be stated in […] metaphors referring to the light’ (TI, 207). Yet is this appeal to a form of antithetic light any less problematic? It seems not, for arguably a light before the Truth, a light ‘anterior to the Platonic light,’ and thus a certain non-light, is merely an essence set in negation (WD, 91). At a rhetorical level, such a negation appears more palatable. And yet as Derrida is quick to see, the proffered non-light entails an exposure to a ‘certain enlightenment’ (WD, 85). In practice then, the thesis (the light) infiltrates its antithetic binary (the non-light) and, as such, subsists as an absent presence. Given the play of this differential schema, we can thus determine that Levinas plots a tacit return to the provisional Hellenic categories he utilizes in negation.
What can be seen in terms of an inside/outside dichotomy also holds sway in Levinas’ thought. In the first section of *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas refers to the ‘I’ or *cogito* that apprehends itself through an act of inhabitation:

> The *way* of the I against the ‘other’ of the world consists in *sojourning*, in *identifying oneself* by *existing here at home with oneself*. In a world which is from the first other the I is nonetheless autochthonous. It is the very reversion of this alteration. It finds in the world a site [lieu] and a home [maison]. Dwelling is the very mode of *maintaining oneself* (*TI*, 37).

The I’ or cogito that is ‘at home’ with itself thus sojourns or arises as an autonomous monad; everything is comprehended within the site or locus of the Same. It is this type of egology that Levinas opposes through his appeal to the exteriority of the Other, an-Other sometimes reconfigured as the Stranger: ‘the Stranger […] disrupts the being at home with oneself’ (*TI*, 39). Self-sufficiency within the edifice of the Same is thereby disrupted by that which precedes any act of inhabitation. In effect, the ‘outside’ can be seen and understood as a presupposition that challenges the interiority of ego-centred being. Yet upon reflection, this spatial dichotomy merely perpetuates the binary logic that underpins Heidegger’s thought. For Heidegger one dwells in a state of ‘thrown-ness’ before the inhabitation of any conceptual frames. However, this ‘outside the edifice’ is in actuality within. That is to say, Heidegger deconstructs the conceptual edifice only to build anew what amounts to a primal shelter.10 Likewise, Levinas appeals to that which is exterior; he appeals to the exterior face, a *face* that in some sense exceeds the interior play of the Same. Yet according to Levinas, this *face* also precedes the imposition of impersonal Being. This overt opposition to Heidegger is somewhat dubious given the fact that the exteriority of the *face* is in actuality akin in its ideational orientation to the notion of Being. Indeed, arguably that which resides ‘outside’ of the deconstructed edifice (Being), is equal to that which lies beyond or exterior to the enclosed Same. It would thus seem that Levinas deletes or *obliterates* Heidegger’s notion of exteriority but fails to erase it completely. Authentic exteriority becomes non-exteriority and hence, as Derrida puts it, ‘its truth is its untruth’ (*WD*, 112). For Derrida, Levinas therefore employs a spatial metaphor in a state of ruin – his thought is dressed-up in ‘tradition’s shreds and the devil’s patches’ (*WD*, 112).
Given the above factors, one might readily conclude that the post-Nietzschean super-founderalism Habermas attributed to Heidegger is manifestly present in the counter-Heideggerian work of Levinas. Gillian Rose, a critic of postmodernism in its ethical guise, alludes to this paradox thus: ‘Levinas, in spite of the contrast between the foundational nature of Heidegger’s *being-towards-death* and his own account as nonfoundational, has produced a foundational account.’ In brief, the non-light, the non-foundation, leads to an (en)lightenment of sorts. The light, the truth, thus subsists as a silent axiom or *telos*. Consequently, to cite Rose, Levinas’ thought is ‘immersed in all the difficulties of modernity just as much as the philosophy’ it would seem to transcend. The causal factors relative to this re-inscription might be surmised thus:

> The attempt to achieve an opening towards the beyond of philosophical discourse, by means of philosophical discourse, which can never be shaken off completely, cannot possibly succeed within language […] for language in its entirety already has awakened as a fall into light. That is, if you will, language arises with the sun. Even if ‘the sun is never named … its power is in our midst’ (Saint-John Perse). (WD, 110-13)

In an essay entitled ‘Responding to Levinas,’ David Boothroyd suggests that any attempt to deconstruct, surpass, delimit, or go beyond the logocentric tradition is liable to end in failure. For Boothroyd, such a tradition exhibits a singular propensity for recapturing any discourse that sets its sights at such a process of transcendence. As Derrida has shown us, both Levinas and Heidegger are recaptured by the tradition they seek to exit. For Levinas, ethical liberation is thus offset by a reoccupation of a previously repudiated absolute. Set within the elliptic words of Celan, the attempt to knock away the ‘light-wedges [lichtkeile]’ of a posited Totality runs the risk of returning ‘the floating word [das schwimmende Wort]’ to the dawn of a new ‘dusk’.

For critics such as Étienne Feron, the pith of Derrida’s reading of Levinas can be summarised thus: ‘philosophical discourse can only say the Other in the language of the Same.’ Despite such factors, ten years after the first publication of ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ Levinas published his second major ethical treatise, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* (1974) – a complex reconfiguration of his earlier work, composed in the ‘light’ of Derrida’s critique. This second major treatise attempted to plot
an ‘otherwise than (Heideggerian) being’ or a ‘beyond essence’ – hence its rather laboured title. Yet is such a response to Derrida possible within the lexis of the Same? Is there an appeal to alterity that does not amount to an act of poisoned flattery?

In answer to these questions, let us re-examine Derrida’s concerns. If one were to further summarise Derrida’s argument, one might be inclined to suggest that it focuses on the problematic notion of representation. According to Derrida, the Other is re-presented within the founding terms of the Greek philosophical lexicon. In other words, Levinas attempted to breach the edifice of philosophical discourse through philosophical discourse; that is, he appealed to what Derrida terms a kind of ‘unheard of graphics, within which philosophical conceptuality would be no more than a function’ (WD, 111). But Levinas’ ‘unsaid’ or ‘unheard’ re-presentation, his so-called ‘true representation’ (TI, 200), is reliant upon what might be termed an audible method of philosophical conceptuality. Such a method of conceptuality cannot be so readily reduced to an inert function. As Eaglestone has argued, true representation is still a form of representation – it is still complicit with the underlying violence of the Greek logos or word. Moreover, according to Derrida, Levinas’ radical appeal to the straightforwardness of the face of the Other is a form of empiricism. As he suggests:

> The true name of this inclination of thought towards the Other, of this resigned acceptance of incoherent incoherence inspired by a truth more profound than the ‘logic’ of philosophical discourse, the true name of this renunciation of the concept, of the [...] transcendental horizons of language, is empiricism. (WD, 151)

In simpler terms, Levinas appeals to the exterior face of the Other by way of a pre-conceptual empirical gesture. Yet in the final analysis, is not such an empirical gesture still fettered to the philosophy it would seem to precede? In Derrida’s own terms, such empiricism is nothing more than an impossible dream that must ‘vanish at daybreak, as soon as language awakens’ (WD, 151). As with ‘true representation,’ Levinas’ own brand of empiricism is therefore subservient to a pre-existing conceptual structure, a structure in which infinity’s excess over totality is rendered in the language of totality. For Derrida, Levinas thus discards his principal weapon, his principal means of overcoming the Greek lexeme – in short, he rejects a profound ‘disdain of discourse’ (WD, 116). It is this rejection that leads to the paradoxical re-inscription of totality, a process of re-
inscription carried out in the name of infinity itself. The metaphor of the face is thus self-effacing as it harbours the rumblings of a supressed (and thus suppressive) Truth. Arguably, a similar point can be seen at play within the lines of Celan’s ‘Ein Dröhnen’:

EIN DRÖHNEN: es ist
die Wahrheit selbst
unter die Menschen
getreten,
mitten ins
Metapherngestöber.

[A RUMBLING: it is
Truth itself
Walked among
men,
amidst the
metaphor squall.]

Let us not be misled by the above analysis though; Derrida’s reading is not to be construed in terms of a direct assault. On the contrary, as Derrida himself suggests, the questions raised in ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ are not objections per se; they are more accurately questions that are posed to us by Levinas himself. As Simon Critchley puts it, Derrida’s text is ‘not directed against Levinas’ – nor is it a direct ‘critique of Levinasian “ethics.”’ Instead, the questions that arise within the course of Derrida’s reading, issue, in an immanent sense, from within their host. Derrida thus relinquishes any sense of objective critical purchase. In the place of a straightforward polemic, he opens up what he takes to be the incongruent or contradictory threads that give both shape and form to Levinas’ philosophical tapestry. Such openings are treated as intrinsic fissures rather than gaping faults. Nevertheless, as I have illustrated, such fissures harbour a shadowy re-inscription of Heideggerian ontology. But according to Bernasconi and Critchley, this re-inscription is not paraded for the sake of critical or trenchant negation. Instead, they argue, Derrida’s reading can itself be read as a subtle attempt to bring to the fore the manoeuvre per impossibile that occurs within Levinas’ work. In other words, Derrida tenders what can be seen and understood as a ‘double reading’ of Levinas:

A double reading […], which, by following and eventually leaving the path of commentary, shows, on the one hand, the impossibility of escaping from
logocentric conceptuality and, on the other, the necessity of such an escape arising from the impossibility of remaining wholly within the (Greek) logocentric tradition. Letting these two motifs interlace, Derrida's essay displays the necessity of these two impossibilities and suspends the critical moment of deciding between them.\(^{20}\)

For Critchley, Derrida thus offers a reading that leaves Levinas' thought 'suspended and hesitant' in a space set between two metaphysics \((ED, 93)\). In effect, this state of hesitant suspension opens up what can be construed as a 'hollow space,' a space or locus set between the Greek and Hebraic traditions. On the one hand, Levinas would seem to evade or skirt the Greek tradition through 'recourse to a Hebraic origin and a messianic eschatology which are opened from within an experience of alterity which the Greek philosophical tradition can neither reduce nor comprehend' \((ED, 94)\). On the other hand, Levinas' process of evasion occurs within the language of the Same or totality; in short, the escape is bound to the Greek representative \(\text{logos}\). Derrida's text thus inhabits the vacuous space set between these traditions – a process of immanent inhabitation that suspends polarised judgement: 'we shall not choose between the opening and totality' \((WD, 84)\).

Yet is it possible to merely acquiesce thus in the face of such tensile interplay? As Critchley asks:

> Can one choose not to choose? Does not a choice secretly announce itself within the suspension of choice? Derrida does not wish to explore the space of messianic eschatology that opens within experience; he merely wishes to indicate it, to point it out, like Cortez before the Pacific Ocean. \((ED, 95)\)

Yet Derrida's 'choice not to choose' can be read as a silent provocation; that is to say, his apparent acquiescence itself announces the need to reconfigure the pacific waters of alterity. As I shall argue, in what amounts to an implicit response, Levinas takes up this challenge. In fact, in texts such as \(\text{Otherwise than Being}\), the later Levinas probes the opening Derrida is loath to explore. If Derrida can be likened to the passive Cortez standing before the Pacific Ocean, perhaps Levinas has more in common with Magellan in the sense of facing up to the Pacific divide.

Arguably, \(\text{Otherwise than Being}\) can thus be read in terms of a reconfiguration of Levinas' earlier work; a reconfiguration composed in
the light of Derrida’s reticent reading. Indeed, although he at no point engages ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ in any direct sense, there is evidence to suggest that Levinas had absorbed Derrida’s findings prior to the first publication of Otherwise than Being. In 1973 Levinas published a short essay entitled ‘Wholly Otherwise’. This essay appeared in an edition of L’Arc, an edition dedicated to the work of Derrida. Therein Levinas suggests that Derrida’s work signals a new break in the history of philosophy: it cuts into the heart of Western thinking and spells the ‘end of a naïveté, of an unsuspected dogmatism.’ Yet echoing the double-gesture in Derrida’s essay, such applause is counterbalanced by discourse that challenges the validity of deconstruction itself. For Levinas, set within Derrida’s radical departure from the truth, there still subsists a residual appeal to certainty or security: ‘Derrida still has the strength to say “is it certain?” as if anything could be secure […] and as if security and insecurity should still matter.’ In what can be interpreted as an implicit allusion to ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ Levinas would thus appear to highlight the fact that Derrida’s polemic does not wholly depart from a re-inscription of logocentric discourse. In effect, Levinas would seem to find in Derrida ‘some of the inconsistencies that Derrida had found in Levinas.’ Given such facts, there appears to be little doubt that Levinas had assimilated and actively interrogated Derrida’s critique of texts such as Totality and Infinity prior to the publication of his second magnum opus, Otherwise than Being.

All the same, for Levinas, the task of this later text was akin to that of Totality and Infinity; both texts explored the ‘possibility of a break out of essence.’ For example, in a key section of Otherwise than Being entitled ‘Substitution’, Levinas opens his discussion with the following epigraph:

\[
\text{Ich bin du, wenn ich ich bin.} \\
\text{[I am you, when I am I.]} \\
\text{(OB, 99)}
\]

Arguably, within this fragment of Celan’s poetry lies the essence of Levinas’ ethic as expressed in Totality and Infinity – the constitution of the ‘I’ (subjectivity) occurring within a non-allergic encounter with the wholly Other: ‘I am you, when /I am I’ (OB, 99). But how to express this ethical proximity in a manner that is not ultimately recouped within that which Levinas terms the closed images of thematic appropriation? (OB, 100).
As Derrida had graphically illustrated, the transcendental dislocation of the Greek *logos* is manifestly Sisyphean at the level of philosophical disclosure. In point of fact, Levinas seems to concede as much when admits that the *logos* recovers and covers over ‘every ex-ception’ – every negativity and nihilation (*OB*, 8).

Having said this, is there perhaps what Derrida has deemed a ‘non-site’ or non-locus from which such lucidity can be challenged? In an interview with Richard Kearney, Derrida suggests that he is unsure as to whether the site of his readings can be properly termed philosophical: ‘I have attempted […] to find a non-site, or non-philosophical site, from which to question philosophy.’ In a similar fashion, Levinas claims that *Otherwise than Being* ‘signifies a null-site [non-lieu]’ (*OB*, 8). Yet surely such a ‘null-site’ is harboured within discourse. By definition, such a site is an area occupied by something – in this instance, the intelligible Platonic Sun or Greek *logos*. Derrida agrees. In fact, as we have already seen, it is crucial for Derrida that we think of such a non-site in terms of an immanent locus. The later Levinas would seem to be of the same mind, for instead of appealing to an empirical Other beyond discourse, he changes tack and invokes the infinite within language itself. That is to say, the ethical encounter is said to occur within or through discourse. As Edith Wyschogrod suggests, Levinas thus ‘deflects his attention from the Face as bearing the warranty of [ethical] language to language itself.’

According to critics such as Critchley, this process of deflection amounts to what he terms a ‘linguistic or deconstructive turn’ which produces an equivocal disturbance within philosophical discourse (*ED*, 8). I would argue that this disturbance forms an integral part of Levinas’ reaction to Derrida’s oblique critique. At the start, Levinas outwardly admits that the lexeme of the Same ‘sticks like ink to the hands that push it off’ (*OB*, 8). Or otherwise stated, he was well aware of the fact that any inscribed transcendence re-inscribes that which is ostensibly effaced. Given this fact, Levinas suggests that one might have to abandon normal inscriptive practices – that is, one might ‘have to go all the way to the nihilism of Nietzsche’s poetic writing, reversing irreversible time in vortices, to the laughter which refuses language’ (*OB*, 8). And yet arguably, the poetic realization of Nietzsche’s pugnacious polemic in the modernist poetics of writers such as T. E. Hulme is fettered to an ego-centric propensity that is irreconcilable with any sense of the ethical. ‘As in extreme youth,’ such radical subjectivity thus ‘breaks with essence’ at too high a price (*OB*, 8). Furthermore, with reference to Nietzsche’s poetic reversal, Levinas maintains that ‘negativity, still correlate with being, will not be enough
to signify the *other than being* (OB, 9). The so-called ‘strangeness’ of Levinas’ later text cannot therefore be attributed to a poetic reversal of terms. Instead, I would suggest that the enigmatic style of *Otherwise than Being* can be interpreted in terms relative a poetic textual turn designed to disrupt any final act of overt philosophical inscription. In point of fact, I would agree with Colin Davis when he argues that elements of Levinas’ enigmatic method appear intended to disorientate the reader – that is, they seem calculated to ‘delay rather than to facilitate understanding’.

Indeed, Levinas employs textual tactics that both impede passive consumption and bring to the fore the physical actuality of the word. For example, hyphens dissect what appear to be key phrases or terms. In the original French, some of these words are both hyphenated and italicized: ‘disinterestedness’ appears as ‘dés-intéres*sement*.’ As Davis also points out, in the original French, multiple hyphens are used to connect and combine separate words. Such connections form awkward composites: ‘prior to every memory’ becomes ‘antérieur-à-tout-souvenir.’

In a broader context, Levinas also utilizes what might be termed a micro/macro form. For example, rambling compound sentences coexist with a surfeit of aphorisms. The text can be construed as both vertiginous and claustrophobic. Without doubt, such disparate play is deliberately designed to disorientate. At a thematic level, Levinas also casts off much of his earlier terminology. In its place, he adopts a new vocabulary – a vocabulary that is far more fluid. As Étienne Feron points out, this new vocabulary ‘ceaselessly interrupt[s] itself’ as one posited term is substituted for another. This process of fluid substitution prevents any sense of conceptual stasis. In the few cases where Levinas does employ what appear to be key terms, they are usually paradoxical or at least somewhat enigmatic. The recurrent phrase ‘pre-original’ is a case in point. One is left to contemplate what it is that can precede ‘the origin which nothing can (by definition) precede?’

Thus, what Jean Daive has said of Celan’s method of communication is arguably applicable to Levinas’ poetic turn: ‘Paul creates an aquarium effect that muffles what he communicates, makes it hard to hold on to, hold on to immediately.’

At a certain level, the stylistic form of *Otherwise than Being* is therefore clearly different from that of *Totality and Infinity*. This difference is perhaps comparable to that which demarcates Joyce’s *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. While *Totality and Infinity* sought to explicate the beyond in the manner of the Hegelian *Ulysses*, *Otherwise than Being* alludes to this project, but employs a textual style that appears, by design,
to be obstructive.\textsuperscript{32} That is to say, lucidity is eclipsed in Levinas’ later text, be it by baffling paradox, contradiction, repetition or poetic surface play. As in the poetry of Celan, Levinas thus appears to be working at the limits of that which communicable. Yet whereas such puzzling play is often applauded in poetry or works of fiction such as \textit{Finnegans Wake}, in the context of ethical thought it has met with a degree of enmity. Luce Irigaray for one has accused Levinas of employing a ‘number of words without always defining or redefining them.’\textsuperscript{33} Others have criticized Levinas for being indecisive.\textsuperscript{34} In contrast, I would suggest that this wordplay and lack of lucidity is imperative. As will become apparent, to criticize what Levinas terms his ‘barbarous expression[s]’ (\textit{OB}, 178) is to miss the point.

Unlike the fictional work of Joyce and the poetry of Celan, it is important to remember that Levinas’ text remains a work of philosophical inscription; albeit, to quote Drucilla Cornell, a ‘philosophy of the limit.’\textsuperscript{35} Yet how does such a work ‘that means to be philosophy’ (\textit{OB}, 155) escape philosophy? I return to the fundamental question: how does Levinas circumvent the violent re-inscription of the Other within philosophical discourse? Or within the imagery of Celan, how does Levinas avoid the ‘permanent possibility of [linguistic] war’ (\textit{TI}, 21) thereby inducing the executioner’s axe to flower?

\begin{quote}
ICH HÖRE, DIE AXT HAT GEBLÜHT,
Ich höre, der Ort ist nicht nennbar

[I HEAR, THE AXE HAS FLOWERED,
I hear, the place is not nameable]\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

In texts such as \textit{Totality and Infinity} the ethical encounter was said to be pre-linguistic. In Levinas’ later rejoinder, ‘the ethical’ becomes, to use Derrida’s own turn of phrase, an ‘ultralogical affect of speech’ (\textit{WD}, 133). In other words, the ethical encounter is no longer located at the level of pre-cognitive empiricism; instead, it is relocated as an épi-phénoménal (and as such, non-nameable) effect of language itself located ‘upstream of the “content” of any message.’\textsuperscript{37} Central to this reformulation is what Levinas terms ‘the Saying’ and ‘the Said.’

There seems little doubt that we are linguistically constrained by the ‘resources of logocentricism’ (\textit{ED}, 122), for to enter into (conceptual) discourse is to partake in the ubiquitous workings of the Greek \textit{logos}. Construed in this specific light, discourse is what Levinas refers to as ‘the
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Said: ‘The logos said has the last word dominating all meaning’ (OB, 169). Levinas’ earlier work thus re-inscribed an essence or ‘last word’ within the sphere of ‘the Said.’ Hence, as Derrida puts it, Levinas’ earlier work (ouvrage) did not Work (Œuvre) for the ‘wholly Other’ became inscribed, and as such enslaved, within the discourse of Being.38 Yet as Derrida also inquires, how does the later Levinas relocate the Other within discourse or language; that is to say, ‘how does he manage to inscribe or let the wholly other be inscribed within the language of being, [...] within its syntax and lexicon, under its laws?’39 In the final analysis, are not all transcendent ‘explosions [...] recounted’ (OB, 169) within the materiality of the Said?

And yet for the later Levinas, the Said is not the be-all-and-end-all of language. On the contrary, the Said is itself unbound by a secondary element. Derrida alludes to the possibility of such a secondary element thus:

Mustn’t one reserve the question, at least in appearance, and ask oneself if [...] language is not of itself unbound and hence open to the wholly other, to its own beyond, in such a way that it is less a matter of exceeding [...] language than of treating it otherwise [...].40

In Otherwise than Being, the Sisyphean effort to exceed language is indeed forsaken. Instead, Levinas treats language ‘otherwise’ through an appeal to what I have termed a secondary element. Literally, for Levinas, each and every utterance can be construed as a ‘situation, structure or event in which I am exposed to the Other as a speaker or receiver of discourse’.41 Conveyance or reception of that which is Said therefore entails an ‘exposure’ of sorts, an exposure that Levinas dubs the Saying. For Levinas the Saying can be construed as a ‘pre-original’ aspect of language. In precise terms, the Saying is not what one might call a modality of cognition, but rather a profound openness to an-Other that, by itself, marks the very condition of any cognitive act. Devoid of any sense of temporality, the Said thus presupposes the Saying – a Saying that is the very condition of all possible communication (OB, 48). As Levinas puts it:

Antecedent to the verbal signs it conjugates, to the linguistic systems and the semantic glimmerings – a forward preceding languages – it [the Saying] is the proximity of one to the other, the commitment of an
Thus, instead of marking a return to the Heideggerian ‘primal shelter,’ philosophical discourse is, at least in one important sense, conditioned by an ‘abandon of all shelter’ (OB, 48); that is to say, such discourse is conditioned by an exposure to an-Other. For Levinas, such insight cures the myopia that has so often afflicted Western philosophy – a philosophy that has focused primarily upon the Said to the detriment of the Other.

Arguably, this radical reformulation of the ethical encounter is problematic though, for how is Levinas able to communicate or make known the Saying? Surely the Saying can only be Said in the same manner as the Other can only be elucidated in the discourse of the Same. Can it be that Levinas has returned, like Ulysses, to the impasse set down in his earlier work? Is his radical reformulation nothing more than a literal re-formation of a defunct idea? I would suggest not. In order to see why, we must return to my earlier discussion of style. As I suggested above, for Levinas, Otherwise than Being is a work or text that ‘means to be philosophy’ (OB, 155). Yet notwithstanding this intention, Levinas’ text is counterbalanced or interrupted by a multitude of devices that disrupt the sedimentation of the philosophical Said. The task or Work (Œuvre) of Otherwise than Being can thus be seen in terms of an ‘incessant unsaying of the said, […] a movement going from the said to unsaid’ (OB, 181). And yet surely, as Levinas seems only too aware, such disruptions are inextricably tethered to their host:

Every contesting and interruption of this power of discourse is at once related by the discourse. Thus it recommences as soon as one interrupts it […]. This discourse will be affirmed to be coherent and one. In relating the interruption of discourse or my being ravished by it, I retie its thread […]. And are we not at this very moment in the process of barring up the exit which our whole essay is attempting, thus encircling our position from all sides?43

As Levinas suggests here, the stylistic endeavour to sever the logocentric Said appears to culminate in a conceptual process of retying. Prima facie, this process of retying serves to offset the Work of Levinas’ work (ouvrage). As Levinas goes on to suggest:
Janus Head

Does not the discourse that suppresses the interruptions of discourse by relating them maintain the discontinuity under the knots with which the thread is retied again?

The interruptions of the discourse found again and recounted in the immanence of the said are conserved like knots in a thread tied again [...]. And I still interrupt the ultimate discourse in which all the discourses are stated, in saying it to one that listens to it, and who is situated outside the said that the discourse says, outside all it includes. That is true of the discussion I am elaborating at this very moment.44

In the above, the thread of logocentric discourse is perhaps retied in and through the very act of textual exposition – in and through, that is, the act of exposing a radical discontinuity. Yet this said, internal disruptions subsist as knots in this performative excerpt; knots that ultimately slip or untwine when, at this very moment, an address is made. Crucially, the phrase ‘at this very moment’ is a performative node or knot in this instance. As Critchley has suggested, the repetition of this key phrase ‘involves a dislocation, or displacement, where the same phrase, when repeated in two different but related contexts, interrupts itself and says something wholly other’ (ED, 124). In summary, such an interruption offsets the Said by belying the logical law of bivalence. In this way, the phrase announces itself as an instant in which the Said becomes unsaid. As Critchley further suggests, Levinas thus ‘finds a way of retying the knot[s] which does not mend the thread, one which produces an irreducible supplement to the Said – namely, Saying (ED, 127). Consequently, any propounded process of exposition or elucidation is beleaguered by an irreducible supplement that manifests itself at the disruptive level of stylistic form. In a nutshell, such form unbinds that which is always already bound.

In a reworking of a short but perceptive reading by Jill Robbins, we can relate this notion of unbinding back to a short story by S. Y. Agnon – a writer who Levinas held in high esteem. Robbins focuses on a story entitled ‘Knots Upon Knots’. Therein the narrator leaves a popular craftsmen’s convention and pays a brief visit to an old bookbinder who is entrusted with his overnight things and some other belongings. The bindery is to be painted in the morning, so the narrator is urged to ‘clear out’ his things, for if ‘they were not lost they were sure to be messed
up.45 Having no satchel, the narrator is obliged to improvise a means of conveyance. Under the watchful gaze of another, he attempts to tie his many packages together:

I went over to the biggest of the packages and took the rope that was on it in order to tie one package to another. The rope was old and knotted in knots upon knots, and on every knot that I unraveled I bruised my hands and tore my fingernails. And when I had finally unraveled all the knots, the rope fell apart. Its mate that I untied from a different package was no better. I unraveled it and it weakened, I knotted it and it disintegrated.46

The practical or utilitarian attempt to unravel the impedimental knots thus amounts to nothing – the rope literally falls apart. In the absence of the knots, the integrity of the whole is compromised. Analogously, there is perhaps no sense of the conceptual Said in the absence of ethical Saying. Nevertheless, after some considerable effort, Agnon’s narrator manages to fashion what appears to be an adequate rope, a rope constructed out of the many parts left to hand. Yet in the end, his labours prove futile:

I heard a dull noise and saw that my things were falling. The rope I had worked so hard to assemble had been weak from the start, and when I began to move, the package on my shoulders shook, the rope tore, and the articles scattered.47

In an analogous fashion, logocentric discourse is retied in works that attempt to bear the burden of lucidity. To a certain extent, Otherwise than Being is akin to Totality and Infinity in the sense that it too bears such a weight. However, as I have shown, the burden of lucidity is counterbalanced in Otherwise than Being by a disruptive style that ‘unbinds’ that which is ‘weak from the start’ – specifically, that which is Said. Arguably, it is in this manner that the articles of textual law are scattered.

However, in the final analysis, for all its radical supplementation of the Said, Levinas’ Otherwise than Being remains a work of philosophy. Perhaps, like a gentle breeze, it is only poetry, an aphotic poetry, a poethics without light, which can gather such scattered words in a
manner that denies final formulations. Levinas hints at such a possibility in his reading of Celan. In 1972 he published an essay entitled ‘Paul Celan: From Being to the Other’, an essay later reproduced in Proper Names (1976). As Robbins maintains, Levinas’ central claim therein would seem to be that the ‘poem in Celan goes toward the Other’ – in other words, there is in Celan’s work an underlying ‘attempt to think transcendence.’

In Levinas’ own terms:

[F]or Celan the poem is situated precisely at that pre-syntactic and […] pre-logical level, but a level also pre-disclosing: at a moment of pure touching, pure contact, grasping, squeezing – which is, perhaps, a way of giving, right up to and including that hand that gives. A language of proximity for proximity’s sake, older than that of ‘the truth of being’ […] – the first of the languages, response preceding the question, responsibility for the neighbor, by its for the other, the whole marvel of giving.

Configured thus, the poem does not let the ‘truth originate’ in a quasi-Heideggerian aesthetic gesture; poetry is not ‘the saying of the unconcealedness of what is.’ On the contrary, Celan’s poetic mode is reconfigured in terms of a process of ceaseless self-interruption – in brief, at a pre-syntactic level, the inaudible language of proximity calls one to ethical account. In applied terms, I would argue that Celan’s clarity of diction (or the purity of the Said) is counterbalanced or interrupted by the presence of multi-accentuality or what might be otherwise termed polysemic play. For example, in the first stanza of a poem entitled ‘Etched away’ (1967) one encounters the following lines:

… das hundert
zungige Mein-
gedicht, das Genicht.

[… the hundred-
tongued my-
poem, the noem.]51

As the critic Michael Hamburger explains in his introduction to Celan’s work, “Mein-gedicht” could […] mean “my-poem”, but it could also mean “false poem” or “pseudo-poem”, by analogy with the German word “Meineid”, a false oath. In Levinasian terms, such internal ambiguities
render irresolute any cognitive or noematical purpose – they render irresolute that which is Said. Within this schema, Celan’s polysemic play would appear to rupture the light of what Levinas had earlier termed Totality. Within Celan’s own terms, although the poem might show an unmistakable tendency towards falling silent, it is this silent ambiguity (the un-said) with becomes a performative rapture from within which the poem reaches unto the ‘wholly Other’. As Robert Sheppard has put it, if successful, poetry is ‘arguably able to articulate [the] saying in the said of the dialogic performance.’ If Otherwise than Being can be construed as a movement ‘going from the said to unsaid’, it is thus perhaps only poetry that enacts an ‘incessant unsaying of the said’ (OB, 181). Consequently, despite Levinas’ own early reticence with regards to a ‘poethics’, it is, I would argue, just such an aphotic mode that best enactsthe breach of ontological Totality he sought. In point of fact, Levinas comes close to articulating the selfsame sentiment when he proclaims that one can give oneself ‘in saying to the point of poetry’ – or contrariwise, one ‘can withdraw into the non-saying of lies.

EC Ethical Criticism, Robert Eaglestone
ED The Ethics of Deconstruction, Simon Critchley
OB Otherwise than Being, Emmanuel Levinas
TI Totality and Infinity, Emmanuel Levinas
WD Writing and Difference, Jacques Derrida

Notes

2 Levinas, Proper Names 46
3 Levinas, Proper Names 46
8 Celan, Selected Poems 293 & 317 & Paul Celan, ‘The Meridian: Speech on the Occa-
sion of the Award of the Georg Böchner Prize’ in Celan, Selected Poems 408
11 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Massachusetts: MIT, 1991) 104
13 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law 38. For a further critique of postmodernism that also addresses ethical issues, see: Gillian Rose, Love’s Work (London: Chatto & Windus, 1995) 126-135
15 Celan, Selected Poems 316-7
21 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Wholly Otherwise,’ trans. Simon Critchley, Re-Reading Levinas 3
22 Levinas, ‘Wholly Otherwise,’ trans. Critchley, Re-Reading Levinas 5. It is to be noted that Levinas is referring to a section of Derrida’s La voix et le phénomène (Paris: P.U.F, 1967) 106 (‘Is it certain?’ – ‘Est-ce-sûr?’)
23 Davis, Levinas 68
24 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998) 8, hereafter, OB.
otherness [...] lest it leads to a new idolatry: that of the immemorial, ineffable Other.’
27 Davis, Levinas 71
28 In the English translation by Alphonso Lingis, the majority of this syntactical play is removed. As suggested, ‘dés-intéressement’ becomes the slightly more palatable ‘disinterestedness.’
29 Feron, De l’idée 118 qtd. in Davis, Levinas 70
30 Davis, Levinas 72-3
31 Daive, Under the Dome 71
32 It is to be noted that Totality and Infinity is by no means a (linear) analytical treatise. As Derrida points out in a notation: ‘Totality and Infinity [...] proceeds with the infinite insistence of waves on a beach: return and repetition, always, of the same wave against the same shore, in which, however, as each return recapitulates itself, it also infinitely renews and enriches itself.’ In the self-same notation, Derrida further claims that Totality and Infinity is a work of art and not a treatise.’ See: Derrida, Writing and Difference 312n7.
34 Tim Woods, ‘The Ethical Subject: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,’ Ethics and the Subject, ed. Karl Simms (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997) 57
35 Drucilla Cornell qtd. in Eaglestone, Ethical Criticism 136
36 Celan, Selected Poems 334-5
39 Jacques Derrida, ‘At this very moment in this work here I am,’ trans. Ruben Berezdivin, Re-Reading Levinas 16. As Bernasconi and Critchley suggest, Derrida’s reading in ‘At this very moment in this work here I am’ is ‘largely based upon Otherwise than Being, a text which [...] is far more attentive to the sort of problematic generated by deconstructive reading than Totality and Infinity. Second, one might also read “At this very moment” as a re-reading of “Violence and Metaphysics,” an attempt to reformulate a response to Levinas’s work in the light of Levinas’s “response” to Derrida in Otherwise than Being.’ See: Bernasconi & Critchley, Introduction, Re-Reading Levinas xiv.
40 Derrida, ‘At this very moment in this work here I am,’ Bernasconi & Critchley eds., Re-Reading Levinas 16-17
41 Davis, Levinas 75
43 Levinas, Otherwise than Being 169. In ‘At this very moment in this work here I am,’
Derrida quotes this passage and italicizes the phrase ‘at this very moment.’ I have retained this emphasis in my quotation.

44 Levinas, Otherwise than Being 170. Again, Derrida quotes this passage in ‘At this very moment in this work here I am’. As in the previous quotation, I have retained Derrida’s emphasis of the phrase, ‘at this very moment.’


46 Agnon, A Book that was Lost 126

47 Agnon, A Book that was Lost 127. For Levinas’ approach to the fiction of Agnon, see, Levinas, Proper Names, ‘Poetry and Resurrection: Notes on Agnon’ 7-16. Therein, Levinas argues that Agnon’s fiction frustrates the refuge in ontological stasis. That is to say, the Agnonesque aesthetic ‘de-nucleates’ the ultimate solidity or essence that subsists beneath the plasticity of forms (Levinas, Proper Names 10). Levinas suggests that in this specific sense Agnon’s aesthetic mirrors the enigmatic modality of rabbinical interpretation – a mode of hermeneutical interpretation that shrouds the immobile or static movement of the sign within an intricate tissue of fluid commentaries. According to Levinas, just such a fluid breach of totality can be isolated in Agnon’s rhetorical use of Biblical quotations – reticent quotations devoid of quotation marks. At one level, such pseudo-quotations echo what are termed ‘master formulation[s]’ (Levinas, Proper Names 9). Yet at another level, such quotations signify in the isolated context of the passage in which they (re)occur. In this manner, such tacit echoes become fissures that open up the closed structure of binary thought. Otherwise stated, Agnon’s dissonant double-coding displaces a binary structure that cannot abide the presence (or absent presence) of what Levinas terms an ‘excluded middle’ (Levinas, Proper Names 10).

48 Robbins, Altered Reading 144

49 Levinas, Proper Names 41


53 Celan, Selected Poems 408-9


55 See essays such as ‘Reality and Its Shadow’ for Levinas’ quasi-Platonic critique of art and poetry. Put simply, Levinas appropriates the Platonic ethos but substitutes the Ideal for an encounter that he would later develop into the ethical ‘face-to-face.’ His logic dictates that any such encounter transcends the play of figuration or the aesthetic
56 Levinas, ‘Ethics of the Infinite’ 65