Alfred Baeumler on Hölderlin and the Greeks:
Reflections on the Heidegger-Baeumler Relationship
(Part II of III)
Frank EdlerMetropolitan Community College
[Click here to review part I of the essay.]
The second part of this article has taken on a life of its own, so to speak. Before moving on to Heidegger’s view of Hölderlin and the Greeks and then comparing it to Baeumler’s view, I decided to re-examine their political and philosophical relationship in 1932-33 and trace it more clearly. This addition grew into a substantial section of its own and became Part II.
Let me go back to the summer of 1932 when Heidegger gave a talk at the Technical University of Dresden at Baeumler’s invitation. The talk that Heidegger gave was some version of "On the Essence of Truth" ("Vom Wesen der Wahrheit"). In the references page to the Pathmarks (Wegmarken) volume, Heidegger notes that this talk was "revised several times" and "delivered on different occasions" beginning in Bremen in 1930. He also mentions that it was given "in summer 1932 in Dresden."1 The latter is clearly the talk given at Baeumler’s invitation. The significance here is that Heidegger had not published anything since 1929; he was in transition and it was unclear where he stood on the issues. Heidegger defends himself on this point in "Facts and Thoughts":
Everyone was in a position to know what I thought about the German university and what I considered its most pressing concern. It was to renew itself by returning to its essential ground, which is also the essential ground of the sciences. . . In 1930 I spoke on the essence of truth. I repeated the lecture in a number of different German towns until 1932 and it was known through copies that were circulating. (SGU, 482; SDU, 22)
Thus, the essay "On the Essence of Truth" must be seen within the context of Heidegger’s pedagogical concerns with respect to the transformation of the university. That transformation, however, is itself dependent on whether there can be transformation concerning Dasein’s relatedness to being. Whether one agrees with Heidegger or not, it is important to recognize that Heidegger is treating the essay as a political text. In my estimation, Heidegger became political around 1929-1930 in the broad sense that he seriously began to relate his philosophical concerns to the conditions that make radical political change possible.
Is there any evidence to indicate how Baeumler responded to Heidegger’s talk in Dresden in 1932? Fortunately, there is. Baeumler gave a number of talks between the summer of 1932 and May 26, 1933, when Heidegger gave his rectoral address. They include "Theoretical and Political Man" ("Der theoretische und der politische Mensch," February 20, 1933), "The Volk and the Cultivated" ("Das Volk und die Gebildeten," radio address in Berlin, April 3, 1933), and "University and State" ("Hochschule und Staat," June 26, 1932, with variations in May and June of 1933). (MW, 169) These talks contain direct and indirect references to Heidegger.
In the talk "University and the State," Baeumler challenges the notion that science is a matter of maturity and that the youth may not be ready for the depth of knowledge and commitment science demands. Baeumler then goes on to say that "The enthusiasm with which the young soul seizes a problem is something completely different than a little bit of ‘attunement’ ["ein bisschen ‘Stimmung’"]. It is the origin from which science itself arises." (MW, 146) The allusion here to Heidegger’s notion of Stimmung or attunement is unmistakable, especially since Baeumler places it within double quotation marks.
As we shall see in a moment, the political speeches that Baeumler gave during 1932-33 include criticisms of Heidegger’s philosophy in terms of its ability to comprehend and guide the revolution. The above reference is the first small criticism. In his endnotes, Baeumler states that although his talk "University and State" was first given on June 26, 1932, he repeated the talk in revised form during the summer of 1933 at the universities in Munich and Göttingen and that the text of the talk in Mannerbund u. Wissenschaft is taken from the revised version given in the summer of 1933. (MW, 169)
In his criticism of Heidegger, Baeumler is comparing his concept of enthusiasm (if it is "his" concept ) to Heidegger’s concept of attunement and implying that "a little bit of attunement" is inadequate to understand the revolutionary mood of the youth and, thus, the revolutionary situation of the university and the country. What was occurring, according to Baeumler, was "a transition [Übergang] from ‘autonomous’ science and cultivation [Bildung] to politics." (MW, 140)
The liberalism of the Weimar republic was finished and with it the liberal university. A new state was emerging—a "real Volkstate." The problem for the university was "whether it could be political from the ground up." (MW, 140) But what does it mean for a university to be a political university and for science to be political? What does it mean to redefine science and the university in relation to the Volk?
The Stimmung that Baeumler wants is not Heidegger’s but Nietzsche’s. After reminding his audience that Nietzsche did more than just criticize science, Baeumler introduces the following unidentified quotation of Nietzsche: "I want to show that the heroic mood [Stimmung] is needed in order to submit to science." (MW, 142) Baeumler then redefines science in the following way:
Science is not a product of the superficial intellect [read liberalism], but rather a creation of ratio grounded in the depths of heroic inspiration [ein Schöpfung der in der Tiefe heroischer Begeisterung gegrundeten Ratio]. The "sobriety" ["Nuchternheit"] of science is not to be understood as the unanimated cowardice of positivistic pedants, but rather as the rigorous discipline which enjoins itself [sich selbst auferlegt] to the enthusiasm for the truth. (MW, 142-143)
Heidegger and Baeumler are very close here in their criticism of ratio: both believed that logic and reason had become groundless. Both believed that if there was to be a "new man," a "new university," and a "new state," an essential part of the revolution would involve the process of grounding ratio in a more originary origin.
Heidegger’s criticism of ratio is evident in a letter to Egor Vietta (June 16,1931). Vietta was in the process of writing an article on Heidegger which would appear a few months later in Die Neue Rundschau (The New Review) under the title "Heidegger und die Situation der Jugend" ("Heidegger and the Situation of the Youth"). 3 In his letter, Heidegger states the following:
My struggle [mein Kampf] against ‘logic’ is not that of one who despises the concept; on the contrary—radical conceptual penetration [Durchdringung] of precisely the most essential matters is not only required—but can carry it a fair distance. My struggle concerns the ‘ratio’ which has become groundless and which perpetuates a game of wits lacking all essentiality. It is a matter precisely of understanding in an originary way the concealed governance [verborgene Walten] of the ancient Greek ‘logos’ and setting it to work. 4
Already the difference between Baeumler and Heidegger is evident. Baeumler wants to ground ratio in heroic enthusiasm; Heidegger wants to deconstruct ratio back to its hidden grounds in the logos of the ancient Greeks.
But how was Baeumler’s solution going to produce a new science—a political science? To see how Baeumler attempts to do this, I shall turn to another of his political talks entitled "Theoretical and Political Man" ("Der theoretische und der politische Mensch") given on two occasions: February 20, 1933, to the student body at the University of Hamburg and February 27, 1933, to the student body at the Technical University of Dresden. (MW, 169) It was also published in various student newspapers in March, April and May of the same year. (MW, 169) About the same time (February 21, 1933), Victor Klemperer notes in his journal that "it was in the newspapers that Baeumler was named a candidate (next to Krieck!) for the Prussian Cultural Ministry under Hitler. In a division meeting, he behaved as if he already were minister. One advised saving the severely threatened Pedagogical Institute. The German Nationalists want to abolish the academic training of teachers. Baeumler said, ‘They are overestimating the influence of the German Nationalists in the coalition.’— politics everywhere and everywhere terror from the Right."5 Thus, Baeumler and Krieck were being considered for positions of the highest level just weeks after Hitler was named Chancellor on January 30, 1933.
Although Klemperer does not mention Heidegger’s name, it could well be that he too was being considered for the Prussian Cultural Ministry. Hugo Ott presents a report (9 April 1933) about Heidegger written by Wolfgang Aly which states the following: "To take the first point raised at our recent discussion, concerning the alliance of National Socialist university teachers, we have ascertained that Professor Heidegger has already entered into negotiations with the Prussian Ministry of Education."6 If this is true, then Heidegger would have been Baeumler’s competitor and this may have been the reason for Baeumler’s criticism of Heidegger in the above-mentioned talk.
In "Theoretical and Political Man," Baeumler directly criticizes Heidegger as he attempts to show how a new science—a political science—can be established which is consonant with the revolutionary transformation of the republic into a Volksstaat. The main thread of Baeumler’s talk consists in redefining the "scientific spirit" (which will turn out to be heroic enthusiasm) in the context of the polar opposition between "theoretical man" (characterized by pure consciousness, passivity, and absolute contemplation) and "political man" (characterized by directionality, activity, and participation). Spirit (Geist) cannot be identified either with intellect or with consciousness. (MW, 99)
"Originally, it [Geist] designates what is alive, what is life-giving what guides and directs and what is efficacious in us—thus, what is active! (. . .) Pure consciousness [theoretical man] is not the source from which science originates; rather it is something all-embracing and originary [etwas Umfassender und Urspruengliches], simply put the spirit [Geist]. It is the spirit which compels the intellect to give birth to science. Science too has its origin in enthusiasm [Begeisterung]." (MW, 99-100)
But not all peoples possess this spirit: "It is primarily the peoples of the north, the Germanic peoples, who become productive in science. The Greeks who brought forth the concept of science which is still valid today, are the Germanics of the Mediterranean. It is no coincidence that we know the Germanics as a war-like race. They are a people of discovery and conquest." (MW, 100) Thus, science as a specific kind of activity is based on heroic enthusiasm and heroic enthusiasm in turn is based on race. In effect, it is Baeumler’s racial politicization of Nietzsche’s will-to-power.
In this political talk, one senses the joy— almost delight— Baeumler takes in using the distinction between theoretical and political man in order to turn the tables on the mandarins of the German universities—those elitist professors (the Max Webers, Heinrich Rickerts, and Eduard Sprangers) ensconced in their citadels of cultivation (Bildung) based, according to Baeumler, on the absoluteness of pure conscious-ness, objectivity, and contemplation. The tide was now turning and Baeumler engages it by acting out his own version of Nietzsche’s transvaluation of values.
What is odd is that after using this distinction between theoretical man as passive and political man as active for more than three-fourths of his talk (for 15 pages of the 19-page printed version), Baeumler takes back the distinction: "Pure theoretical [passive] behavior on the one side—activity on the other. This division is false. . ." (MW, 108) Two pages later, he introduces the reason why it is a false division:
The ‘theoretical man’ is the knowing, passively behaving man. But the moment of contemplation and of passivity applies to knowing as well as to doing [Handeln]. (. . .) The distinction is false if one divides an active interest from a contemplative disinterestedness. (MW, 110)
But why does Baeumler need to redefine the distinction after he has already used it for 15 pages rhetorically to "trash" theoretical man? Because he needs to make room for his criticism of Heidegger:
Practical interest—I’m referring here to an unpublished work by Albert Holfelder—is characterized by the fact that it addresses itself towards changing the world. To be practically active means to change the world, means to get hold of things, grasp them; the theoretically-active interest, on the other hand, leaves things unchanged. But this leaving-things-unchanged is not identical with being uninterested. Whoever is completely uninterested no longer understands.
The fundamental act is: letting the world be. (The concept of "letting be" in this sense comes from Heidegger.) In comparison with the one who acts [Handelden], the one who reflects [Betrachende] lets the world be. But it is a misunderstanding of this act if one foisted an absolute contemplation onto this letting-be. This letting-be has no relation to the tendency to universalize; it does not demand the death of living interest; it does not require mortification or asceticism. We are casting a glance here on an extensive historical context: the scientific— scholarly subject is supposed to withdraw completely from the world like a monk of the Middle Ages who leaves the world behind in order to dedicate himself completely to the via contemplativa. The theoretical man is the secular monk: distant from the world in absolute safety, he leads a life of asceticism which clearly is always in danger of transforming into an idyllic life. Such a place of safety does not correspond to a sense of living inquiry [lebende Forschung] arising from great impulses. Science and scholarship could never be carried out in the idyllic nooks of monks. Positivistically inclined research corresponds to the monk’s type of science which holds onto particular instances, which does not seek new methods, which does not take risks.
It is not holistic "letting-be" nor absolute contemplation ad mortification which is the presupposition of science, but rather the living active spirit [Geist]. (…) It is not a question here of a separation between two psychological types, but rather a question of the determination of the essence of science from its origin [Ursprung]. (MW, 111)
I have quoted Baeumler at some length here because it is one of the few instances we have in which Baeumler in the early months of 1933 not only refers to Heidegger but also challenges him directly. The new differential Baeumler introduces between theoretical man (active and passive) and political man (active and passive) is taken from young Albert Holfelder’s unpublished article entitled "The End of Normative Pedagogy" ("Das Ende der normativen Pädagogik"). Baeumler published the article in 1935 when he took over the German co-editorship of the journal International Education Review (Internationale Zeitschrift für Erziehung). In the first issue edited by Baeumler (1935), Holfelder’s article appears prominently as the lead article right after an introductory remark by Bernhard Rust, Reichsminister of Education, expressing his best wishes for the journal’s success. (In 1936, Holfelder was one of Rust’s advisor’s in the Office of Education).7
Baeumler had to find a new differential for distinguishing theoretical man from political (practical) man in his attempt to categorize Heidegger because Heidegger did not fit into the old category of theoretical man as passive, purely contemplative, and totally withdrawn in a world of lifeless universals projected by pure consciousness. This is the worst form of Cartesianism Heidegger’s philosophy seeks to overcome. Baeumler could never get away with lumping Heidegger into this category of "theoretical man."
An interesting point here is why Baeumler defers to young Holfelder’s analysis of Heidegger (Holfelder turned 30 in 1933) rather than relying on his own analysis. Nowhere in his talk does Baeumler show any familiarity with Heidegger apart from Holfelder’s own discussion of him, which leads me to wonder how familiar Baeumler really was with Heidegger’s work. It may be that Holfelder had a special interest in Heidegger, and Baeumler took the opportunity to show off his protégé in print. Holfelder himself shows a familiarity and understanding of Heidegger’s work—even though incorrect—that Baeumler never shows in any of his works and political speeches with the sole exception of Baeumler’s reference letter for Heidegger written on September 22, 1933. No doubt Holfelder had high aspirations. In the version of Holfelder’s article that Baeumler published in 1935, Holfelder says that "it would be a grateful task to develop the system of National Socialist pedagogy out of the manifold forms of National Socialist educational reality. Such a pedagogy can indeed become an object of science like the whole phenomenon of education, but it cannot arise out of science." (ENP, 12) In this connection it is worth mentioning that from 1938 to 1945, Holfelder was head of the Office of Education (Amt Erziehung) under Reichsminister of Education Bernhard Rust,8 and that Baeumler—after the war—refers to him as "the horribly striving Holfelder" ("der grauenhafte Streber Holfelder"). (MB, 209)
Returning to Baeumler’s talk, the differential he incorporates from Holfelder is reminiscent of Marx, albeit in Nietzschean garb: political (practical) interest is directed towards changing the world whereas theoretical interest is directed towards leaving things unchanged. This enables Baeumler to set up four categories: 1) theoretically passive man, 2) theoretically active man, 3) practically passive man, and 4) practically active man. Now Baeumler can indeed say that Heidegger belongs to the active side but only the active side of theoretical man, not the active side of practical man. I take it that the designation "active" is supposed to account for Heidegger’s analysis of the readiness-to-hand of equipmental being while the designation "theoretical" is supposed to show that Heidegger’s concept of letting-be is inadequate for a philosophy intent on changing the world.
In his article (1935), Holfelder presents the basis for his distinction which Baeumler does not discuss, namely, that praxis is based on the human ability to step out of or break through the circle of what is originally given in human existence, whereas theory does not do so and in not doing so, allows itself to be addressed by that reality. (ENP, 5) In other words, in theory or reflective knowing (das betrachtende Erkennen) one "stands under" ("unterwirft") reality as it presents itself and—Holfelder now introduces a direct quotation (unidentified) from Heidegger: "according to an often misunderstood phrase from Heidegger—lets what is be what it is and how it is" ["das Seinde sein lässt als das was es ist und wie es ist"]. (ENP, 5) The source of Holfelder’s Heidegger quotation is almost certainly the talk "On the Essence of Truth" which Heidegger gave in Dresden in 1932 at Baeumler’s invitation. It is the only work by Heidegger at that time which specifically explicates the concept of letting-be.
In contrast to Baeumler, however, Holfelder does not refer to Heidegger in order to criticize him. He simply refers to Heidegger’s concept of letting-be as the best articulation of reflective knowing without denigrating theory the way Baeumler does: "The demand of political science is grounded much more on the understanding that the knower too is a real human being who, as known, conducts himself in relation to his real destiny." (ENP, 7) Holfelder recognizes reflective knowing (betrachtende Erkennen) and active practical knowing (taetigen Erkennen) as two different but legitimate activities of the human Geist. Indeed, the task of the new political sense of science and scholarship is to bring Betrachten (reflection) and Handeln (practical activity) into a unity that does not obliterate the difference between them. (ENP, 7)
Although Baeumler in the long quotation presented above from "Theoretical and Political Man" tries to soften his criticism of Heidegger by showing that he does not share all the negative characteristics of theoretically passive man, he nevertheless goes on in the same paragraph to talk about theoretical man as a secular monk who withdraws completely from the world into a place of safety and contemplation. Anyone who knew Heidegger would know of his retreats to his "Hutte" in Todtnauberg and to Benedictine monasteries and could easily see Heidegger precisely as such a secular monk.
There is one final criticism I would like to point out in Baeumler’s "Theoretical and Political Man." Early on in his talk, Baeumler states that the presupposition of theoretical man is that pure consciousness places itself outside of reality in a neutral and disinterested position which guarantees its absolute objectivity. (MW, 96-97) However, since pure consciousness for Baeumler is a function and not a location, scientific knowledge related only to pure consciousness is related to nothing:
To comport oneself theoretically thus means to act in such a way as if one were not a living, interested human being, as if it were possible for human beings to place themselves into the pure nothing of pure consciousness [in das reine Nichts des reinen Bewusstseins]. (MW, 97)
It is difficult—at least for me—not to see this as an indirect criticism of Heidegger’s notion of nothingness in "What Is Metaphysics?" The full extent of Baeumler’s difference to Heidegger can readily be seen in the political talk he gave over the radio on April 3, 1933, entitled "The Volk and the Cultivated"—the same day that Heidegger wrote Jaspers saying "Baeumler is keeping quiet; from his brief letter I got the impression he was annoyed." (Ott, 24):
There are those of a contemplative nature; there are moments of reflection in every person’s life, but one cannot determine the being of man according to that. The fundamental law of this being is a law of activity. Every single person "is" a total system of active dealings [Handlungen] and nothing more. (MW, 115)
It is unclear when Heidegger became aware of Baeumler’s criticisms. In his letter to Jaspers (April 3, 1933), he gives no indication that he is aware of them. As a member of the Political-Cultural Community of German University Professors (KADH, Kulturpolitische Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Hochschullehrer) organized by Ernst Krieck, Heidegger did write to Krieck on two occasions (April 8 and April 22) requesting that he include Baeumler and Hans Heyse as members of the oorganization (Farias, 152, 154) It strikes me as somewhat odd that Heidegger would push for the inclusion of Baeumler if he knew of Baeumler’s criticisms unless he simply regarded them as small beer and let them roll off of his back. Baeumler’s criticisms, however, were not minor. The upshot of Baeumler’s criticisms is that the new concept of science could not be determined on the basis of Heidegger’s philosophy (this is prior to Heidegger’s rectoral address).
Looking backwards, Heidegger does mention Baeumler in "The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts" as one who conspired against him: "In a somewhat different manner [than Krieck] Alfred Baeumler was busy raising the same suspicions in his education journal, which he published on behalf of Rosenberg’s Office." (SGU, 499; SDU, 40) Heidegger is referring to the International Education Review (Internatinale Zeitschrift für Erziehung) that Baeumler took over in 1935. (Baumler was also editor of a new journal Worldview and School (Weltanschauung und Schule) founded in 1936 in which Holfelder is listed as an additional editor). Heidegger mentions nothing of Baeumler’s political speeches given in the early months of 1933.
In his Rektoratsrede of May 27, 1933, Heidegger rrespondsdirectly to Baeumler’s criticisms although he does not mention Baeumler by name. Not too long before that on May 10, Baeumler had given his own inaugural address for his new position, Chair of Political Pedagogy, at the University of Berlin. 9 Baeumler’s inaugural address was the kick-off for the infamous burning of books: after his address, Baeumler marched at the head of his students to the square between the university and the opera where Goebbels gave a speech and the books were burned.10
Both Heidegger and Baeumler were now party members and both held positions of some power at the university level: Baeumler held an ideological professorship at the prestigious University of Berlin close to influential positions in Berlin; Heidegger was Rector of Freiburg University. Given Baeumler’s speeches in February, March and April, it was no surprise that Baeumler joined the party and accepted the ideological professorship. In Heidegger’s case, however, most people were shocked when they learned he had joined the party.
Nevertheless, the very first line of Heidegger’s rectoral address made it clear where he stood on the controversy of the primacy of Geist (spirit) versus Rasse (race): "The assumption of the rectorate is the commitment to the spiritual [geistige] leadership of this institution of higher learning." (SGU, 470; SDU, 9) Heidegger italicized the word ‘geistige’ to give it even more emphasis. In fact, the word ‘Geist’ (and ‘geistig’) appears twenty-three times in the address. Heidegger does not use the word ‘Rasse’ or ‘Hitler’ or ‘National Socialism’ or ‘Fueherprinzip’ (leader-principle) or ‘Blut-und-Boden’ (blood and soil) although he comes very close to the latter once in the phrase "erd-und bluthaften Kräfte" ("strengths tied to earth and blood"). In comparison, Baeumler in his inaugural address uses words like ‘Rasse (twice), ‘Fuehrerprinzip’ (three times), ‘National-sozialismus’ (‘nationalsozialistisch’) (four times), and ‘Hitler’ (eight times). Although Baeumler also uses the word ‘Geist’ (and ‘geistig’) fairly frequently, it is ultimately based on a phphilosophicaloncept of race that appears to be broader than the biological concept.11
In his rectoral address, Heidegger also counters Baeumler’s criticism that since science originates from political (practical) man, the new concept of science could never be understood or derived from theoretical man, the type to which he claimed Heidegger belonged. Both Baeumler and Heidegger agree that the spiritual (geistige) mission of the university is grounded in the essence of science. I think Baeumler would also agree with Heidegger’s statement that "the will to the essence of the German university is the will to science as will to the historical mission of the German people as a people that knows itself in its state." (SGU, 471; SDU, 10) Disagreements, however, would immediately follow on how to interpret this statement. For Heidegger, if there is to be a revolution (his position as late as Nov. 30, 1933, is that the revolution hasn’t even begun in the universities) and if the universities want to retain their self-governance and assert themselves in the setting of their own task, then it must be a two-fold questioning of the essence of science in relation to the questioning of the historical mission of the German people. That is why Heidegger says, "Together [his italics] science and German destiny [Harries translates Schicksal here as fate which may be too strong] must come to power in this will to essence." (SGU, 471; SDU, 10) For Heidegger, the self-assertion of the German university is nothing but "the shared will to its essence," that is, "a true struggle for the essence of science" shared by students and teachers in conjunction with the shared questioning of their own historical being. (SGU, 471; SDU, 10).
Heidegger criticizes the new concept of science -- the new political ones proposed by Baeumler and Krieck -- because they are simply contesting the "self-sufficiency and lack of presuppositions" of modern theoretical science. These critiques of science in the name of National Socialist ideology do not go far enough: "Such doing is merely negative; looking back hardly beyond the last decades, it has turned by now into a mere semblance of a true struggle for the essence of science." (SGU,471; SDU, 10) Heidegger's main criticism here is that even if we do agree, for example, with Baeumler's critique of theoretical man and admit that the absolute objectivity of science and scholarship does have presuppositions that include 1) the privileging of pure consciousness as the most important faculty for knowledge, 2) the positing of a pure, atemporal conscious-ness outside of reality, and 3) the claim that this pure, atemporal consciousness is neutral and completely disinterested -- even if we agree to all this, Heidegger states in his address that "we will not experience the essence of science in its innermost necessity." (SGU, 471; SDU, 10) In other words, Baeumler short-circuits the will to essence as a questioning process both in relation to science and in relation to the historical being of the Germans. In "Theoretical and Political Man," for example, Baeumler begins to move toward a "positive" understanding of science after having criticized theoretical man. In this transition, he states the following:
The scholar, the researcher, the scientist – they are not identical with "theoretical man." Customarily, one usually thinks the matter in the following way: there is such a thing as theoretical man (a "truth-finding act") and the scholar, the researcher are particular forms, and indeed the active forms, of "theoretical man in general." But being researcher, being scholar does not mean the following: being a modification of a general theoretical comportment [Verhaltens], but rather it means something specific. Science is the outcome [Ergebnis] of a specific activity. It is not the product of contemplating behavior [kontemplierenden Verhaltens], not the offspring [Erzeugnis] of an absolute consciousness, but rather the offspring of scientific spirit [Geist]. This is no tautology. When I trace science back to its origin, what I am expressing thereby is that science has its origin in a specific activity. (MW, 99)
Baeumler is doing exactly the same thing he accuses theoretical man of doing. He first privileges activity over consciousness; second, he simply asserts that science has its origin in a specific kind of activity; third, he admits he's playing a game of definitions when he says "This is no tautology." Baeumler is manipulating abstract concepts and types in the same way that he's accusing "theoretical man" of doing. More importantly, this manipulation and re-definition of concepts has no historical context whatsoever. It occurs in just as much of an historical vacuum as pure, atemporal consciousness does outside of reality.
Even the semblance of deductive thinking breaks down in the middle of the next paragraph:
It is the spirit [Geist] which compels the intellect to give birth to science. Science too has its origin in enthusiasm [Begeisterung]. The genuine researcher and the genuine scholar are imbued [erfuellt] with scientific enthusiasm, but they are not representations of a general "theoretical attitude." It is a bold, a daring spirit that first brought forth the sciences. The same spirit engendered [erzeugt] technology [Technik] of which we all too often see only the destructive side but whose essence is thoroughly positive, synthetic, "constructive." Not every race [Rasse], not every people [Volk] has this spirit; some races and peoples have no understanding whatsoever of it and so, on the contrary, always intend only the intellect. It is primarily the peoples of the north, the Germanic peoples, who became productive in science. The Greeks who brought forth the concept [Begriff] of science which is still valid today, are the Germanics of the Mediterranean. (MW, 100)
The definition of science as a specific kind of activity is left unexplained, unsupported, and without any historical context. We are told that science as an activity originates from a spirit of bold and daring enthusiasm which is characteristic of the Germanic race and people and, by implication, not a characteristic of the Jewish race and people (who are only familiar with the intellect). The semblance of logic falls away to reveal a language strung together whose purpose is simply to assert and affirm the racial ideology of National Socialism. Baeumler politicizes Nietzsche's will-to-power and puts it on a racial footing in order to express that ideology. This is not Heidegger's will to essence as a questioning process.
After criticizing the "new concept of science," Heidegger asks the question whether there is to be science and if there is (science is not something that necessarily has to exist in a community), "under what conditions can it truly exist?" (SGU,471; SDU, 11) Heidegger's answer attempts to reconnect the spiritual mission of the university (the will to science) back to the originary event from which science arises: "Only if we again place ourselves under the power of the beginning [Anfang] of our spiritual-historical being (Dasein). This beginning is the setting-out [Aufbruch] of Greek philosophy. Here for the first time, western man, by virtue of his language, raises himself up from a popular base [Volkstum] and stands up to [steht auf gegen] the totality of what is [Seiende im Ganzen], which he questions and conceives [begreift] as the being that it is." (SGU,471; SDU,11)12
This is extremely important. For Heidegger, science arises out of the "event" of Greek philosophy as an Aufbruch: a rupture, a breaking open of a revealing-concealing clearing in such a way that science can emerge from it. This happens "by virtue of his language." Baeumler on the other hand in his political talk "University and State" ("Hochschule und Staat") asserts that "This idea [the idea of science] belongs to us; it is born out of the innermost substance of our race [innersten Substanz unserer Rasse]." (MW, 145) For Heidegger, language makes philosophy and thus science possible; for Baeumler, race-- more specifically, the Germanic race-- makes modern science possible.
In speaking of the Greek "creative impotence of knowing" ("der schoepferischen Unkraft des Wissens"), Heidegger also counters Baeumler's criticism that he belongs to Baeumler's category of "theoretical man." (SGU,472; SDU, 11) The creative impotence of knowing is one of the two distinguishing properties of the original Greek essence of science Heidegger wants to regain for the university community and the German people. Knowing (Wissen) is impotent because it ultimately fails (versagt) in the face of overpowering destiny (Uebermacht des Schicksals). Dasein is thrown finite transcendence; Dasein cannot overcome its own thrownness and finitude; knowing cannot ultimately overcome and master hiddenness and concealment. Nevertheless, Heidegger says that "just because of this, knowing must develop its highest resistance [hoechsten Trost]; called forth by such defiance, all the power of the hiddenness of what is must first arise for knowing really to fail. Just in this way, what is opens itself in its unfathomable inalterability and lends knowing its truth." (SGU,472; SDU, 11)
This relates to Baeumler in two ways: first, Heidegger is stating that he recognizes the importance of the chthonic in this Aufbruch or event of origination of philosophy among the Greeks. In his 1926 introduction to Bachofen, Baeumler claimed that classical philology had missed the dark, hidden side of the Greeks. According to Baeumler, the Homeric world with its Olympian deities of daylight repressed the chthonic realm of the earth that resulted in a "de-potentiation of the depths." (Myth, 21) Death was made into an abstraction and the daemonic realm of the night fled from the bright world of the heavenly Olympians. (Myth, 41; see also Part I of this essay in Janus Head, vol.1, no. 3: 212-214.)
I don't think Heidegger necessarily agreed with Baeumler's interpretation of the Homeric world, but he does recognize the importance of the chthonic when he says that the opening of the whole of what is, is conditional on the rising up of all the power of the hiddenness of what is. Revealing takes place from concealing and is jointed with it, a concealing that can never be overcome by the defiance of knowing. In a letter to Elisabeth Blochmann (January 19, 1933), Heidegger briefly describes this appropriation of concealment: "For us, however, the struggle of appropriation (der Kampf der Aneignung) must ignite from what survives [of the Greeks] and this beginning (Anfang)-- shrouded in darkness and questions-- is what we must carry over (umtragen) in its complete magnitude and bear it forth into what should become our task (Auftrag)." (H/B, 58; SL, 569) About a month earlier in a letter to Werner Jaeger (December 12, 1933), Heidegger comments on Jaeger's essay on Tyrtaeus: "With the 'Tyrtaeus' [essay], you enter that stratum of subterranean philosophizing in antiquity [die. . . Schicht der gleichsam unterirdischen antiken Philosophierens] which hitherto has hardly been surmised." (H/J, 123-124) This subterraneanphilosophizingg is definitely chthonic.
Second, I believe that Heidegger highlights the resistance of knowing in order to deflect Baeumler's criticism of his concept of letting-be. Heidegger's implication is clear: the whole of what is opens itself and lends its truth to knowing only when knowing develops the highest resistance to overpowering destiny. In other words, the highest resistance to overpowering destiny is the Greek form of letting-be: resistance, which ultimately fails, lets the whole of what-is be what it is.13 It is in the development of this highest resistance that Heidegger’s thought becomes open to the danger of fascism. The end of a new appropriation of being does not justify turning a blind eye to the incredible excesses of the "first revolution."
Heidegger shows that his idea of theory does not fall under Baeumler’s rubric of "theoretical man" by stating what theoria originally meant to the Greeks. Theoria is not "pure contemplation" ("reine Betrachtung") pursued for its own sake. This is not what the Greeks meant; rather, the Greeks struggled [kämpften] precisely to conceive and to enact this contemplative questioning [dieser betrachtende Fragen] as one, indeed as the highest mode of energeia, of man’s "being-at-work." They were not concerned to assimilate practice to theory; quite the reverse: theory was to be understood as itself the highest realization of genuine practice. For the Greeks science is not a "cultural good," but the innermost determining center of all that binds human being to people and state [die innerst bestimmende Mitte des ganzen volklick-staatlichen Daseins]. (SGU, 472-473; SDU, 12)
Heidegger is saying that modern derivative distinction between theory and practice (and with it Baeumler’s distinction between "theoretical man" and "political man") collapses when it is thought back to the originary event or Aufbruch from which science arises.
This touches on another difference between Baeumler and Heidegger regarding the relationship between modern science and the ancient Greeks. The two men have fundamentally different perceptions of this relationship. In "University and State," Baeumler clearly believes the Greeks are imbued with theNordicc spirit and that science arises from this spirit; however, modern science is Germanic and not Greek: "Science, as we know it, is a creation of the Germanic sense of independence. . . the Mediterraneanized science of the Greeks was surpassed in the 17th Century by modern science through a new influx of theNordicc spirit. Descartes, Galileo and Kepler are not epigones and destroyers, but rather re-creators of science out of the bold, venturesome spirit [Geist] of the peoples of the north." (MW, 144) Thus, as Baeumler himself says in his inaugural address, "This polis [of the Greeks] cannot be a model for us, but it can serve as an example to show that freedom thrives only there where unity consists in symbols." (MW, 137) Thus, there is no need at all for a retrieval of the Greek beginning or Anfang because modern science has surpassed Greek science and because modern science is a new creation of the Germanic race. Moreover, in his political talk "The Political Student" ("Der politische Student") given on June 26, 1933, Baeumler doesn’t think the danger of losing science among the Germans was very acute. (MW, 155) Why would he? Modern science according to Baeumler belongs to the Germanic race.
Heidegger, of course, sees science in a more precarious situation. Both the Christian-theological interpretation of the world as well as the "mathematical-technological thinking of the modern age, have separated science both in time and in its concerns from its beginnings." (SGU, 473; SDU, 12) The only way for the university to regain its spiritual mission so that it becomes "the innermost determining center [Mitte] of all that binds human being to people and state" is to engage the origins from which Greek philosophy and science arose.
It is important to remember that Greek beginning or Aufbruch occurred by virtue of the Greek language. When Heidegger says that the members of the university community must place themselves under the power of the Greek Aufbruch, this will have to occur in the German language. But what aspect of the German language will enable them to rise up from a popular base and stand up to the totality of what is? What aspect of the German language will enable them to appropriate the origin of philosophy in a new way? Clearly, it must be a German language that has immersed itself in the Greek origin and thought the origin anew in the German language. Heidegger does not broach this question in his rectoral address; however, it is difficult to imagine Heidegger pointing to anything else in the German language other than Hölderlin’s late poetry.
But here too a crucial difference shows itself between Baeumler and Heidegger. Baeumler believes that between the Germans and the Greeks "there is an even more intimate bond than the one that binds through the study of language." Thus, it is not language that is the deepest bond, but rather "the common veneration of manly-youthful enthusiasm that has led us back to the Greeks through Winckelmann and Nietzsche." (MW, 147) For Baeumler, heroic enthusiasm based on race is a deeper bond than language.
My guess is that Heidegger was sorely disappointed when Baeumler would not agree to the necessity of retrieving the origin of Greek philosophy, or to the need for a re-appropriation of the question of being, or to the priority of language for the revolution. These differences must have become apparent during the summer of 1933 when Baeumler on at least two occasions visited Heidegger at his hut in Todtnauberg. Herman Heidegger recalls one such visit "around June 1933" when Heidegger and Baeumler "very quickly defended sharply opposing views which dealt with philosophy as well as National Socialism."14
At the heart of Heidegger’s conception of the revolution is the retrieval of the Greek Anfang and a new appropriation of being. This is clear from Heidegger’s 30 March 1933 letter to Elisabeth Blochmann:
We can discover it [the new basis in Da-sein], as well as the vocation (Berufung) of the Germans, in the history of the West only if we expose ourselves to being itself (dem sein selbst) in a new manner and appropriation (Aneignung). (H/B, 60 ;SL, 570)
Moreover, Heidegger talks about two revolutions in the same letter and that the political frenzy of nazism "can only remain one path of the first revolution (ein Weg der ersten Revolution)." (H/B, 60 ;SL, 571). In other words, there are other paths even in this first revolution. Whatever these paths are—one of them is the nazi political path—which lead to a "first awakening" ("ersten Erweckung"), they are justified only if "we are revolved to prepare ourselves for a second, deeper one [my emphasis]." (H/B, 60; SL, 571)
If it is by virtue of the German language that a new appropriation of being will occur as part of the retrieval of the Greek beginning, are there any indications that Heidegger was preparing a path in the first revolution that would take a radical philological-philosophical approach? Did he try to recruit or engage classical philologists who were also radically minded? This is not as farfetched as it may seem at first sight. On the day he was elected Rector, Heidegger wrote a letter to Carl Schmitt encouraging him to join the National Socialist party.15
There are many indications of Heidegger’s close political collaboration with more radical classical philologists such as Wolfgang Schadewaldt and Wolfgang Aly, although they are difficult to trace. Heidegger returned to Freiburg from his sabbatical on January 7, 1933.16 However, before returning he had already written Werner Jaeger (12 December 1932) praising his essay on Tyrtaeus for having moved into a stratum of Greek philosophizing which Heidegger called subterranean (unterir-dischen). (H/J, 122-123) Heidegger, knowing that Jaeger was definitely planning to come to Freiburg in January of 1933 to give a seminar, invited Jaeger to visit him at his home which was not far from Schadewaldt’s home where Jaeger would be staying. (H/J, 124-128) Wolfgang Schadewaldt was, so to speak, Jaeger’s "prima donna" student, one of the rising stars of classical philology who was now very close to Heidegger and was instrumental in persuading people to consider Heidegger as a candidate for the position of Rector. (Ott, 142-143)
Jaeger, of course, was going to publish Heidegger’s Rektoratsrede in the journal Antiquity (Die Antike) which Jaeger founded and edited, probably the premier journal of antiquity in Germany at that time. Richard Harder, another one of Jaeger’s star students in classical philology and who was Schadewaldt’s close friend, lavished high praise on Heidegger’s rectoral address in the journal Gnomon that Harder edited.17 Why Jaeger didn’t publish Heidegger’s address is unknown. What is odd is that Jaeger wrote an article for Ernst Krieck’s journal Volk im Werden in which he defended his concept of a third humanism against nazi criticisms.18 It looks like Jaeger started down the road of political engagement but then pulled back. Why? On the face of it, the risk of publishing Heidegger’s address seems minimal compared to walking into the lion’s den of the self-proclaimed educational theorist for the whole of National Socialism, Ernst Krieck, who had a reputation for having a vicious mouth as Heidegger himself later found out.
The classical philologist and pedagogue Heinrich Weinstock may shed some light on this question indirectly. In the introduction to his book entitled Sophokles (1931), Weinstock identifies his indebtedness to Werner Jaeger, Friedrich Gundolf, and Stefan George and then goes on to say the following:
But I experienced the deepest confirmation of my interpretation of Sophocles through the philosophy of our day with its turn to the existential. From it, which surrounds and determines us all whether we know it or not, I confirmed that the depth [Tiefe] felt for a long time beneath the surface of Sophocles rests in nothing other than the poet’s will to the real [im Willen des Dichters zum Wirklichen]. The standard of an idealized classic forever faded is transformed into the unrelenting poet of reality, of human reality with all its grounds, backgrounds, and abysmal grounds [Gruenden, Hintergründen, und Abgründen]. This is not to say that Heidegger should now be read into Sophocles. . .
It is rather remarkable to find a classical philologist as early as 1931 using Heidegger’s fundamental ontology as a background for interpreting Sophocles. Weinstock was also clearly promoting the program of Jaeger’s third humanism. More importantly, he uses Heidegger in such a way as to provide a philosophical dimension, better, an ontological depth that is lacking in Jaeger’s discussion of paideia. In addition Weinstock is familiar with Walter F. Otto’s book The Gods of Greece (Die Götter Griechenlands) and refers to it as "his fine book" ("in seinem schönen Buch"). (Soph, 271) Heidegger was corresponding with Otto in 1931. One of the important aspects of Otto’s book is precisely the relationship between the older chthonic deities and the new Olympian ones.
Near the end of Weinstock’s Sophokles, there is an interesting remark that not only foreshadows Heidegger’s own explication of Sophocles later in his Introduction to Metaphysics but also his Rectoratsrede:
Perhaps through Sophocles we can find our way to a new trust of being [Seinsvertrauen] from which alone a new order of existence [Daseinsordnung] can be built, a new community can grow. Here too it is at least possible to see an initiation point from which the worst curse of modern man, his amputation from being and existence, could be transformed into the abundance of a new cosmic and political existence. For Sophocles shows—and this distinguishes him over others who are called on to help—that it is possible to believe in the meaning of being [Sinn des Seins] without making it into an illusion, without transcending it as well. . . (Soph, 295)
By the time we get to the publication of Weinstock’s book Polis in 1934, he has become politically involved in the wars over the educational policy of National Socialism (I do not know whether Weinstock joined the National Socialist Party or not). He is still very influenced by Heidegger—this time by his rectoral address. He lauds Heidegger’s formulation of "knowledge service" (Wissensdienst) as one of three forms of service to the people, but warns that without knowledge cultivation (Wissensbildung), knowledge would be reduced to usefulness and thus to positivism and pragmatism. (Polis, 18)
Indeed, he believes in the possibility of a third humanism via Heidegger and Jaeger more than ever: "The hour for a new encounter with the Greeks is here; a new rebirth of the Greek spirit announces itself in the wind [Wehen] of the German revolution. This is the kairos of a third German humanism." (Polis, 44) However, Weinstock’s attitude toward Jaeger has changed. He doesn’t name Jaeger directly, but the reference to Jaeger in the following quotation is unmistakable:
A so-called renewed humanism understood the self-destructiveness of this position [the historicism of the science of antiquity—especially Wilamowitz] and endeavored to get back to classical philology and thereby opened the way once again to the pedagogical primordial meaning of humanism [Ursinn von Humanismus]. However, it [‘er’ here refers to the new humanism, but it also refers to Jaeger, the leading proponent of it] was not able to carry through a real and, thus, efficacious new movement of cultivation [Bildungsbewegung] because it [the renewed humanism and also Jaeger]—no doubt motivated by concern for German cultivation [Bildung] but without having been deeply shaken by the fundamental threat to German existence [World War I]—held out in a very refined history and philology, in a well-protected inner space similar to science, but did not expose himself to the storm in which, according to Plato, all that is great stands [nicht aber sich dem Sturm aussetzte, in dem nach Platon alles Grosse steht]. (Polis, 43-44)
This is a condemnation of Jaeger-- in effect, accusing him of cowardice. In 1914, Jaeger accepted Nietzsche’s chair at Basel and never fought for his country in World War I. Jaeger’s inaugural lecture for the Basel position was entitled "Philologie und Historie" ("Philology and History").19 What is stunning, of course, is that at the end of the quotation, Weinstock condemns Jaeger by using Heidegger’s language directly from the rectoral address. Heidegger ended his address with a quotation from Plato’s Republic: "’All that is great stands in the storm.’" (SGU, 480; SDU, 19) My speculation is that Weinstock used Heidegger’s language because Weinstock knew that Jaeger and Heidegger were collaborating politically (such as the publication of Heidegger’s rectoral address in Die Antike). When Jaeger pulled back from his collaboration with Heidegger, Weinstock accused him of cowardice using Heidegger’s own language.
Jaeger resigned in 1936 and left for Chicago. It is clear that Jaeger had a guardian angel in the upper levels of Nazi government. As William Calder states,
Of the seventy classics scholars who fled Nazi Germany, the Minister of Education in the Hitler government thanked Jaeger alone for his German work and granted him official permission to accept the Chicago post. A secret directive of the Hitler government in 1941 forbade critical mention of Jaeger in the German press.20
Interestingly, Heidegger says something very similar in his letter (December 15, 1945) to the Chair of the Political Cleanup Committee during the denazification proceedings:
Through Rector Wolf (natural science faculty) of Kiel and Rector Naumann (philosophy faculty) of Goettingen, who had close relations to the Prussian Ministry of Culture, I knew that someone in the Ministry wanted to prevent the development of the university into a technical school against the "political concept of science" pursued by the Party, which was "founded" by Rosenberg and Baeumler "as a worldview."21
Who was this "inside man" in the Ministry of Education? Was it Rust himself? If it was Rust, he was by all accounts the weakest of the Reichministers. The idea of transforming Nazism from the "inside" was clearly an illusion.
(To be continued)
ENP Albert Holfelder, "Das Ende der normativen Pädagogik," Internationale Zeitschrift für Erziehung, vol. 5 (1935), 5-12.
Farias Victor Farias, Heidegger and Nazism, ed. with a Forward, Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).
H/B Martin Heidegger-Elisabeth Blochmann, Briefwechsel 1918-1969, J.W.Storck, ed. (Marbach: Deutsche Literaturarchiv, 1989).
H/J Frank H.W. Edler, "Heidegger and Werner Jaeger on the Eve of 1933: A Possible Rapprochement?" Research in Phenomenology, vol. 27 (1997), 122-149.
MB Thomas Mann und Alfred Baeumler. Eine Dokumentation, eds. Marianne Baeumler, Hubert Brunträger and Hermann Kurzke (Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann, 1989).
MW Alfred Baeumler, Männerbund und Wissenschaft (Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt, 1934).
Myth Alfred Baeumler, Das mythische Weltalter. Bachofens romantische Deutung des Altertums (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1965).
Ott Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, trans. Allan Blunden (London: Basic Books, 1993).
Polis Heinrich Weinstock, Polis. Der griechische Beitrag zu einer deutschen Bildung heute an Thukydides erläutert (Berlin: Die Runde, 1934).
SDU Martin Heidegger, Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität. Das Rektorat 1933-34: Tatsachen und Gedanken (Frankfurt a/M: Klostermann, 1983).
SGU Martin Heidegger, "The Self-Assertion of the German University. The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts," trans. Karsten Harries, Review of Metaphysics, vol. 38 (March 1985), 467-502.
Soph Heinrich Weinstock, Sophokles (Leibzig und Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1931).
1. Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); 380.
2. Heidegger at the end of his 1929/30 lecture course on the fundamental concepts of metaphysics seems to endorse the concept of enthusiasm in Nietzsche’s song of Zarathustra.
See Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995): 366.
3. Egon Vietta, "Heidegger und die Situation der Jugend." Die Neue Rundschau, vol. 24, no. 2 (October 1931): 501-511.
4. Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger, ed. Guenther Neske (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977): 234-235.
5. Victor Klemperer, Ich will Zeugnis ablegen bis zum letzten, volume I, Tagebuecher 1933-1941, ed. Walter Nowojski accompanied by Hadwig Klemperer, 5th ed. (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1996): 8.
6. Rudiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger. Between Good and Evil, trans. Ewald Osers (Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 1998): 238.
7. Karl Christoph Lingelbach, Erziehung und Erziehungstheorien im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland (Weinheim/Berlin/Basel: Beltz, 1970): 153.
8. Elite fuer Diktatur. Die Nationalpolitischen Erziehungsanstalten 1933-1945. Ein Documenarbericht, ed. Horst Ueberhorst (Duesseldorf: Droste, 1969): 60.
9. Christoph Lindenberg, Die Technik des Boessen. Zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart: Freier Greistesleben, 1978): 61.
10. Guido Schneeberger, Nachlese zu Heidegger (Bern, 1962): 33-34.
11. Winfried Joch, Theorie einer politischen Paedagogik. Alfred Baeumlers zur Paedagogik im Nationalsozialismus (Bern/Frankfurt a/M: Herbert Lang and Peter Lang, 1071): 29.
12. I have modified Karsten Harries’ translation here slightly. Harries breaks up the German verb aufstehen into two movements: western man 1) raises himself up from a popular base and 2) stands up to the totality of what is. The problem is that Harries places the phrase "by virtue of his language" ("kaft seiner Sprache") immediately before "stands up to." Thus, Harries’ translation related the phrase "by virtue of his language" primarily to the "standing up to..." When I read the German, the phrase "kaft seiner Sprache" applies to the whole movement, that is, it applies to the "raising up" as well as the "standing up against." Therefore, I have placed the phrase "by virtue of his language" immediately after "western man" so that the phrase "by virtue of his language" modifies both parts of the movement. In other words, it is by virtue of his language that western man raises himself up from a popular base and stands up to the totality of what is.
13. There is an interesting parallel here to Eugene Herrigel’s experience in learning the Zen art of archery. It appears that the manipulating ego must come to failure before the insight comes on how to let the arrow shoot itself. See Eugene Herrigel’s Zen and the Art of Archery.
14. Frank H.W. Edler, "Retreat from Radicality: Poeggler on Heidegger’s Politics," in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, vol. 14, number 2--vol. 15, number 1 (1991): note 8, 318-319.
15. Safranski, Martin Heidegger, 241.
16. Ibid, 239.
17. Richard Harder, "Martin Heidegger: ‘Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universitaet,’" Gnomon 9 (1933): 441.
18. Werner Jaeger, "Die Erziehung des politischen Menschen und die Antike," Volk im Werden, vol. 1, no. 3 (1933): 43-49.
19. William M. Cader III, "Werner Jaeger" in Classical Scholarship: A Biographical Encyclopedia, eds. Ward W. Briggs and William M. Calder III (New York/London: Garland, 1990): 216.
20. Ibid, 220.
21. Appendix B: "Martin Heidegger and the Denazification Proceedings," in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, vol. 14, no. 2--vol. 15, no. 1 (1991): 547.